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ABSTRACT
This dissertation concerns individual voluntary contributions in the subscription
game with three important model considerations: private information on public good
valuations, threshold uncertainty and the timing of the contribution — simultaneous
and sequential contribution.
In the ﬁrst essay, we set up a simultaneous subscription game model and ana-
lyze how the contributions will be aﬀected when individuals face diﬀerent levels of
threshold uncertainty. Comparative statics with respect to the changes in the cost
distribution are derived. We ﬁnd that when the cost of public good increases in the
sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance, individuals, on average, are more willing
to contribute to the public good. But, when the cost distribution becomes more
dispersed in the sense of mean-preserving spread, individuals, on average, are less
willing to contribute to the public good.
The second essay introduces threshold uncertainty and private information on
valuations for a discrete public good in a subscription game and analyzes how the
players sequentially make their contribution decisions within this environment. I ﬁnd
that the earlier contributor’s expected contribution is lower than the latter contrib-
utor’s expected contribution. The result demonstrates that the earlier contributor
can free ride oﬀ the latter contributor. Comparing the expected total contribution
in the sequential contribution mechanism with that in the simultaneous contribution
mechanism, this paper shows that the expected total contribution in the sequential
model is lower.
The third essay provides the experimental evidence of comparative statics with
respect to the changes in the cost distribution. I conduct a laboratory experiment to
ii
test the theoretical predictions in the ﬁrst essay. The experimental result supports
the theoretical predictions of the comparative statics with respect to the threshold
uncertainty: decreasing the degree of the threshold uncertainty in the sense of mean-
preserving contraction, or increasing the mean of the threshold distribution in the
sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance, individuals, on average, are more willing
to contribute to the public good.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The mechanisms used to allocate public goods vary widely. The most common
way to provide public goods in modern societies is for the government to levy taxes.
Alternative institution, private contribution, plays a supplementary role to the tax-
ﬁnanced allocation mechanism that contributes to the provision on public goods.
We can observe many private contribution processes such as donation, fundraising
by non-proﬁt organizations, and construction of activity centers by neighborhood
associations. Private contributions, then, are not only attractive but also valuable
to investigate.
According to the Giving USA 2013 Report Highlights, the total 2012 contribution
was $ 316.23 billion1. Individual voluntary contribution accounted for 72% of this
total giving amount. This empirical data shows that the individual contribution is
the most important contribution source, thus, the issue explored in this disserta-
tion concerns individual voluntary contribution behavior. I tackle the topic focused
in particular on the subscription game with private information on valuation and
threshold uncertainty.
This dissertation takes into account three important considerations that may
aﬀect individual contribution behavior. The ﬁrst consideration is the valuation of the
public good. Previous studies, for example, Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984), Bagnoli
and Lipman (1989), Issac, Schmidtz and Walker (1989), have been performed in an
extremely rich informational environment in which the valuation of the public good
is commonly known. In contrast, in reality the individual hardly knows in advance
the valuation of others. That means the valuation of the public good is private
1This report is available at http://www.givingusareports.org/
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information.
Besides valuation, the individual also considers how much money is needed to
provide the public good, which is called the threshold. However, it is possible that
individuals do not know the exact provision cost and face cost uncertainty when
contributing to the public good. Therefore, threshold uncertainty is another impor-
tant factor that should be considered when investigating the private contribution
behavior. Realizing that the threshold uncertainty may aﬀect the player’s strategic
contribution behavior, the existing literature, Nitzan and Romano (1990), Suleiman
(1997), and McBride (2006), have introduced threshold uncertainty into the discrete
public good model. The ﬁrst two papers ﬁnd that the threshold uncertainty may
result in an ineﬃcient equilibrium. McBride (2006) shows that an increase of the
threshold uncertainty in the sense of mean-preserving spread increases the player’s
contribution when the value of the public good is suﬃciently high; otherwise, it de-
creases the player’s contribution when the value of the public good is suﬃciently
low.
Another consideration is the timing of contribution. Some super markets an-
nounce checkstand donation campaigns to support the community. This contribution
mechanism is called the simultaneous contribution mechanism since the cashier does
not tell you how much money has been collected when you make the contribution
decision. If you know the accumulated amounts when you contribute to the pub-
lic good, this type of contribution mechanism is called the sequential contribution
mechanism. For instance, churches may announce an organ fund campaign and re-
port the updated contribution level frequently; local governments may announce the
seed donations to future contributors when they launch new public good projects.
These are examples of sequential contribution. Erev and Rapoport (1990) is the
earliest experimental paper that studies simultaneous and sequential moves in a dis-
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crete public good game. Comparing the sequential institution to the simultaneous
institution, they ﬁnd that when subjects made their decisions simultaneously, the
public good was provided 14.3% to 31.3% of the time. But when they made their
decisions sequentially, the public good was provided 66.7% of the time.
Varian (1994) is an early theoretical study of sequential contribution to the pub-
lic good. Varian ﬁnds that early contributors free ride oﬀ the later contributors in
sequential contribution situations, thus total contribution under a sequential insti-
tution is lower than the total contribution under a simultaneous institution. Sev-
eral later experimental and theoretical papers also focus on comparing voluntary
contribution in simultaneous and sequential institution (see Andreoni (1998), Pot-
ters et al.(2005), Masclet and Willinger (2005), Levati et al. (2007), Vyrestekova
and Garikipati (2008), Coats et al. (2009), Ga¨chter et al. (2010) and Bracha et
al.(2011)).
To the best of my knowledge, few papers consider these three model considera-
tions at the same time when investigating private contribution to a discrete public
good in the context of a subscription game. My dissertation addresses this unex-
plored setting.
The ﬁrst essay, a joint work with Timothy J. Gronberg, studies how individual
contributions are aﬀected when facing diﬀerent degrees of threshold uncertainty in
a simultaneous subscription game. As far as we know, few papers consider both
the threshold uncertainty and private information of public good’s value in the sub-
scription game. Thus, this paper complements earlier works on the contribution to
the public good with threshold uncertainty and private information, and investigates
the eﬀect of changing the cost distribution on private contributions. By building
a theoretical subscription game model, this paper demonstrates that if the cost in-
creases in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance, individuals, on average, are
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more willing to contribute to the public good. However, if the costs becomes more
dispersed in the sense of mean-preserving spread, individuals, on average, are less
willing to contribute to the public good.
The second essay develops a theoretical model and examines individual sequential
contribution to the public good in a subscription game with threshold uncertainty
and private information on valuation. This paper aims to analyze three questions:
(1) How do individuals contribute to the public good in the environment with private
information and the cost uncertainty? (2) Do individuals in diﬀerent contribution or-
ders contribute diﬀerently? (3) Comparing sequential and simultaneous contribution
institutions, which institution produces higher total contributions? To the best of
my knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to investigate private contribution to a discrete
public good under the sequential institution with private information and threshold
uncertainty.
The theoretical result of the second essay shows that individual contributions are
increasing with respect to the contributor’s order. Earlier contributors contribute
less than subsequent contributors. This result demonstrates that earlier contributors
free ride oﬀ later contributor and enjoy ﬁrst-mover advantage. Another important
ﬁnding is that individuals contribute to the public good diﬀerently in a sequential
contribution institution compared to a simultaneous contribution institution. Com-
paring the player’s expected contribution in a sequential contribution mechanism
to a simultaneous contribution mechanism, this paper ﬁnds that the expected total
contribution in the sequential institution is lower than the expected total contribu-
tion in a simultaneous one. This result suggests that in an environment with private
information on valuation and cost uncertainty, sequential institutions provide lower
contribution than simultaneous institutions.
In the last essay, I conduct an experiment to test the theoretical predictions in
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Gronberg and Peng (2014), and aim to analyze how individual contribution behavior
is aﬀected when faced with diﬀerent degrees of cost uncertainty in a lab. The advan-
tage of conducting a controlled laboratory experiment is that it helps us to explore
how individuals make contribution decisions in a speciﬁc environment.
The experimental data strongly supports comparative statics with respect to
threshold uncertainty, as predicted by Gronberg and Peng (2014). The main result
of this paper is that decreasing the degree of threshold uncertainty in the sense of
mean-preserving contraction, the individual, on average, is more willing to contribute
to the public good. Also, increasing the man of the threshold distribution in the sense
of the ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance, the individual, on average, is more willing
to contribute to the public good. The results suggest that suppliers of public goods
should consider what kind of information related to the cost uncertainty they should
announce when collecting private contributions.
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2. CHANGES IN THE THRESHOLD UNCERTAINTY IN A SIMULTANEOUS
SUBSCRIPTION GAME∗
2.1 Motivation and Related Literature
Fundraising by non-proﬁt organizations, constructing new buildings by neighbor-
hood associations, and donating to churches are some examples of voluntary contribu-
tion to public goods. The earliest literatures, Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian(1986),
Bernheim (1986), and Andreoni (1989), investigate the situation under certainty.
But in many real world examples of voluntary contribution uncertainty plays a crit-
ical role in individual contribution decisions. This uncertainty manifests in diﬀerent
ways. For example, individuals face a random distribution of their incomes, individ-
uals are not familiar with production technology, or individuals do not know the cost
of providing the public good. This paper considers a model of providing a discrete
public good in a subscription game within an environment of threshold uncertainty
and private information on public good valuations. The focus is on the comparative
statics of a change in cost uncertainty on the private contribution equilibrium under
a simultaneous institution.
A discrete public good, deﬁned as a ﬁxed quantity of a public good, is provided
if the total contributions are large enough to cover its cost; otherwise, the public
good is not provided. This kind of public good is also called a binary or threshold
public good. Typical examples of discrete public goods are roads, parks, community
libraries, local radio programs, school buildings, etc. In a subscription game, the
players’ contributions are refunded if the sum of the contributions are not large
∗Reprinted with permission from “Changes in the Threshold Uncertainty in a Simultaneous
Subscription Game” by Timothy J. Gronberg and Hui-Chun Peng, 2014. Theoretical Economics
Letters, 4, 263-269, Copyright [2014] by authors, Timothy J. Gronberg and Hui-Chun Peng, and
Scientiﬁc Research Publishing Inc.
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enough to cover the cost of the public good.
Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) and Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) are important pa-
pers that analyze private provision of discrete public good. Both papers assume
players make their contribution strategies in the environment with complete infor-
mation of the public good’s value and a certain known threshold level of cost, but
the types of contribution in these two papers are diﬀerent. Palfrey and Rosenthal
(1984) assumed the player to make a binary contribution — zero or a ﬁxed amount
of contribution, but Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) allowed the player to make a con-
tinuous contribution — the player can contribute any non-negative amount to the
public good. These two papers both show that eﬃcient provision of public goods in
the subscription game may exist.
It is possible that the players do not face a certain threshold. For example, it
might not be known how much money will be needed to build a community library
or to complete a public project. Realizing that threshold uncertainty may aﬀect
the player’s strategic contribution behavior, Nitzan and Romano (1990), Suleiman
(1997), and McBride (2006) introduce threshold uncertainty into the discrete public
good model. The ﬁrst two papers ﬁnd the possibility of ineﬃcient equilibrium under
threshold uncertainty. Ineﬃciency may exist because the ex post contribution exceed
the required threshold quantity of contribution or the contributions are insuﬃcient
to cover the required threshold level. McBride (2006) investigates how the degree
of threshold uncertainty aﬀects the players’ contributions and ﬁnds that instead of
having a monotonic relationship between the threshold uncertainty and the contribu-
tion, the eﬀect of changing the threshold uncertainty on the contributions depends
on public good valuation. An increase of the threshold uncertainty in the sense
of mean-preserving spread increases the player’s contribution when the value of the
public good is suﬃciently high; otherwise, it decreases the player’s contribution when
7
the value of the public good is suﬃciently low. In a follow-up paper, McBride (2010)
designs an experiment to test the predictions in McBride (2006) and ﬁnds limited
veriﬁcation. His ﬁndings demonstrate that dispersing the threshold uncertainty is
often, but not always, consistent with the predictions in McBride (2006).
Another branch of literature focuses on the private information on valuation for
the public good. In reality, when an individual makes a contribution decision, he
or she might not know how valuable the public good is to other. In other words,
other’s valuation of the public good is private information. Thus, private information
of public good’s value is a potential factor that aﬀects the player’s contribution to
the public good. Menezes et al. (2001), Laussel and Palfrey (2003), and Barbieri
and Malueg (2008) introduce private information of the public good’s value into
a subscription game with a discrete public good and examine the eﬃciency of the
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. Menezes et al. (2001) use the probability of provision
given that it is socially desirable to provide the public good to measure the ex post
eﬃciency. They show that the probability of provision is smaller than 1. Thus, the
equilibrium in the subscription game is ex post ineﬃcient. Moreover, they provide
evidence that if the cost of the public good is high enough, the subscription game
is better than the contribution game (the game without a refund rule). Laussel
and Palfrey (2003) analyze interim incentive eﬃciency, deﬁned by Holmstro¨m and
Myerson (1983), in the subscription game. They ﬁnd that the interim incentive
eﬃcient equilibrium may exist, and the eﬃcient equilibrium must be a continuous
equilibrium. Later, Barbieri and Malueg (2008) reexamine Laussel and Palfrey’s
work, but show the contrary result that there are no incentive eﬃcient equilibria.
Barbieri and Malueg (2010) include both the threshold uncertainty and private
information of public good’s value in the subscription game. They assume that
player’s value is distributed with a common uniform distribution over [0, 1] and dis-
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cuss how the changes in intensity and dispersion of value aﬀect individual expected
contributions with holding the support of value in [0, 1]. They ﬁnd that increasing
player’s value in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance, or dispersed player’s
value distribution in the sense of mean-preserving spread increases the equilibrium
contributions.
Although McBride (2006) analyzes how the change in the threshold distribution
aﬀects the contribution, he only considers the model with identical and known value
of public good. Barbieri and Malueg (2010) assume the threshold uncertainty and
private information in their model, but they only analyze the eﬀect of changing the
player’s value distribution. This paper complements these existing papers by inves-
tigating the comparative statics eﬀect of changing the cost distribution on private
contributions within a Barbieri and Malueg setting with both threshold uncertainty
and private information.
We show that if the cost distribution becomes more dispersed in the sense of
mean-preserving spread, then the expected contributions will decrease. When the
cost of public good increases in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance, the
expected contributions will increase.
Our results suggest that suppliers may increase contributions to the public good
by reducing uncertainty over the cost distribution or increasing the mean of the cost
distribution.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
considers the comparative statics with respect to changes in cost distribution of the
public good and characterizes the expected contribution. Section 4 is the conclusion.
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2.2 Model
Consider a subscription game consists with n ≥ 2 players. In order to provide
a discrete public good, the players in this game simultaneously make contributions
toward this public good of any non-negative amount. Let xi ∈ [0, vi] be player i’s
contribution. Player i’s value on the public good is vi, i = 1, ..., n. And it is an
independently distributed random variable with a continuous uniform distribution
whose support is [0, 1]. With this assumption, each player’s valuation for the public
good is private information. That is, each player knows his/her own realized valua-
tion of the public good but is uncertain about other players’ valuations of the public
good. Since each player’s value follows the same distribution, this paper represents
a symmetric case.
A discrete public good can be provided if and only if the total contributions
are equal to or larger than the cost of the public good, c (also known as the cost
threshold). Suppose c is unknown when the players contribute to the public good.
However, all players believe that the cost is independent of all vi’s and distributed
with a continuous uniform distribution, F , with support [c¯− z, c¯+ z], where c¯ is the
mean of the cost, z measures the degree of the cost uncertainty.
This paper considers the public good subscription game (Admati and Perry, 1991)
where the player contributions will be fully refunded if the total contributions are
less than the cost threshold. We also assume a zero rebate rule, which means that
the excess contributions will be given to the producer of the public good.
Given F (C) = 1
2z
[
C − (c¯ − z)], the ex ante probability of providing the public
good with total contributions,
[
xi +
∑
j =iE[xj(vj)]
]
, is F
(
xi +
∑
j =iE[xj(vj)]
)
=
1
2z
[
xi +
∑
j =iE[xj(vj)] − (c¯ − z)
]
. Since the player does not know other players’
contributions when making the contribution decision, he/she needs to forecast the
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amounts other players will contribute,
∑
j =iE[xj(vj)]. Because the probability of
provision should be between 0 and 1, we can get (c¯−z) ≤ xi+
∑
j =iE[xj(vj)] ≤ (c¯+z).
Also, we have assumed that vj ∼ U [0, 1] and xi ∈ [0, vi]. This implies that an
important constraint, 0 ≤ (c¯− z) < n ≤ (c¯ + z), must be satisﬁed. This constraint
demonstrates that the number of players in this subscription game needs to be larger
than the lower bound of the possible cost, (c¯ − z), but cannot be larger than the
upper bound of the possible cost, (c¯+ z).
The assumed objective for each player is to maximize his/her own expected payoﬀ.
If the public good is provided, then player i’s payoﬀ is (vi − xi) with the probability
of the provision, F
(
xi +
∑
j =iE[xj(vj)]
)
= 1
2z
[
xi +
∑
j =iE[xj(vj)] − (c¯ − z)
]
; if
the public good is not provided, then player i’s payoﬀ is 0 with the probability,[
1 − F (xi + ∑j =iE[xj(vj)])]. Thus, player i’s expected payoﬀ function can be
written as:
Ui(xi, vi) =
1
2z
(
vi − xi
)(
xi +
∑
j =i
E[xj(vj)]− (c¯− z)
)
(2.1)
Assume Kj ≡ E[xj(vj)] is player j’s expected contribution, thus, player i’s expected
utility function can be rewritten as:
Ui(xi, vi) =
1
2z
(
vi − xi
)(
xi +
∑
j =i
Kj − (c¯− z)
)
(2.2)
Utilizing the maximizing Equation (2.2) with respect to xi and taking the ﬁrst order
condition (F.O.C.) can yield player i’s best response function:
x∗i
(
vi,
∑
j =i
Kj
)
= max
{
0,
1
2
[
vi −
∑
j =i
Kj + (c¯− z)
]}
, ∀ i (2.3)
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Under the assumption of a common uniform distribution in [0, 1], the total ex-
pected contributions by other players,
∑
j =iKj, can be written as (n− 1)K in sym-
metric equilibrium. Hence, Equation (2.3) can be rewritten as
x∗i
(
vi, (n− 1)K
)
= max
{
0,
1
2
[
vi − (n− 1)K + (c¯− z)
]}
, ∀ i (2.4)
From the best response function, Equation (2.4), we can ﬁnd that
[
(n−1)K−(c¯−z)]
is the cutoﬀ point for player i to begin contributing to the public good. In other
words, player i is willing to contribute a positive amount to the public good when
his/her valuation for the public good is equal to or larger than this cutoﬀ point. The
best response function also shows that once player i’s contribution is positive, it is
strictly increasing in a larger valuation of the public good and strictly decreasing in
other players’ expected contributions.
Using the deﬁnition of expected contribution, Ki ≡ E[xi(vi)], and the best re-
sponse function, Equation (2.4), we will have, in symmetric equilibrium,
K = E
[
max
{
0,
1
2
[
vi − (n− 1)K + (c¯− z)
]}]
(2.5)
With player values independently and uniformly distributed on [0, 1], the total
expected contributions by other players,
∑
j =iKj , the expected equilibrium contri-
bution is determined by
K =
∫ (n−1)K−(c¯−z)
0
0dvi +
1
2
∫ 1
(n−1)K−(c¯−z)
[
vi − (n− 1)K + (c¯− z)
]
dvi
=
1
2
[1
2
− (n− 1)K + (c¯− z) + 1
2
[(n− 1)K − (c¯− z)] 12
]
(2.6)
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We can solve Equation (2.6) for K which yields is
K∗ =
1 + c¯− z
n− 1 +
2
(n− 1)2
{
1−
[
1 + (n− 1)(1 + c¯− z)
] 1
2
}
(2.7)
This solution concept is a symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.
Player i’s equilibrium strategy, x∗i , must satisfy Equation (2.4), and K
∗ is deter-
mined by Equation (2.7). Therefore, x∗i can be written as:
x∗i
(
vi, (n− 1)K∗
)
= max
{
0,
1
2
[
vi − (n− 1)K∗ + (c¯− z)
]}
(2.8)
And the cutoﬀ point in equilibrium for each player to begin contributing a positive
amount to the public good, vp, is
vp =
[
(n− 1)K∗ − (c¯− z)] = 1 + 2
n− 1
{
1− [1 + (n− 1)(1 + c¯− z)] 12} (2.9)
Since the lower bound of a player’s value is 0, vp has to be equal to or larger than
0. Thus, we can get a constraint that (c¯− z) ≤ n−1
4
.
Figure 2.1 depicts player i’s equilibrium strategy.
2.3 Stochastic Dominance in Cost Threshold and Comparative Statics
Players may confront cost distributions with diﬀerent levels of dispersion. If the
cost distribution can be controlled or aﬀected by supplier actions, the results in
this paper suggest the beneﬁts of changing information related to the cost of the
public good measured in terms of increase expected total contributions to the public
good. In this section we consider the eﬀects of changes in the cost distribution on
equilibrium contributions.
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Figure 2.1: Cutpoint Equilibrium Strategy
2.3.1 Mean-Preserving Spread in Cost Threshold Distribution
Given each player’s value distribution follows a common uniform distribution over
[0, 1], assume the cost distribution becomes more uncertain in the sense of mean-
preserving spread. For example, the new cost distribution is c ∈ U ∼ [c¯− z′ , c¯+ z′ ],
where z
′
> z.
Proposition 1. A mean-preserving increase in the distribution of cost will decrease
individual expected contribution and the total expected contributions.
Proof.
From (2.7), we know that K∗ = 1+c¯−z
n−1 +
2
(n−1)2 − 2(n−1)2
[
1 + (n− 1)(1 + c¯− z)
] 1
2
in
equilibrium. Diﬀerentiating (2.7) with respect to the degree of the cost uncertainty,
z, we can get
dK∗
dz
=
1
n− 1
{
− 1 +
[
1 + (n− 1)(1 + c¯− z)
]−1
2
}
(2.10)
Since (c¯− z) is the lower bound of the threshold and assume (c¯− z) ≥ 0, [1 + (n−
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1)(1 + c¯− z)]−12 will be less than 1. Thus, we can obtain dK∗
dz
< 0.
Since ∂(nK
∗)
∂z
= n∂K
∗
∂z
and we have ∂K
∗
∂z
< 0, ∂nK
∗
∂z
< 0. Since the expected
contribution per player decreases, so does the total expected contribution. 
The proposition indicates that the players, on average, become less willing to
contribute to the public good when the cost of the public good becomes more uncer-
tain.
We have shown that the cutoﬀ point in equilibrium is vp = 1+
2
n−1
{
1− [1+ (n−
1)(1+ c¯−z)] 12}. Since ∂vp
∂z
=
[
1+(n−1)(1+ c¯−z)]−12 > 0, increasing z will increase
the cutoﬀ point. This indicates that the player will begin contributing a positive
amount to the public good at a higher value as the variance of the cost increases.
The change in z also aﬀects the player’s best response function where x∗ > 0.
This eﬀect can be divided into the direct and indirect eﬀect using the player’s best
response function, x∗, to demonstrate these two eﬀects.
∂x∗
∂z
=
−(n− 1)
2
∂K∗
∂z
− 1
2
(2.11)
=
{1
2
− 1
2
[
1 + (n− 1)(1 + c¯− z)]−12 }− 1
2
(2.12)
=
−1
2
[
1 + (n− 1)(1 + c¯− z)]−12 < 0 (2.13)
From Equation (2.11), we ﬁnd that changing z will change x∗ directly. Hence,
the second term in Equation (2.11) represents the direct eﬀect. Also, changing z
will aﬀect other players’ expected contributions, K∗. The ﬁrst term in Equation
(2.11) measures this eﬀect and is called the indirect eﬀect. Equation (2.12) shows
that increasing the degree of cost uncertainty induces the negative direct eﬀect, the
positive indirect eﬀect. Notably, the direct eﬀect dominates the indirect eﬀect. Thus,
increasing z decreases x∗.
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We ﬁnd that players start to contribute to the public goods at a higher cutoﬀ
point value and the contribution amounts at each possible value of public good weakly
decrease. Hence, the expected contribution to the public good decreases with the
degree of cost uncertainty, z.
Our proposition provides the policy implication that if the suppliers are able to
reduce the uncertainty of the cost distribution, the private contribution to the public
good will increase. The reduction in cost distribution uncertainty will encourage the
players with low value to begin contributing to the public good and also increase
contributions of inframarginal contributors.
2.3.2 First Order Stochastic Dominance in Cost Threshold Distribution
Given each player’s value follows a common uniform distribution over [0, 1], as-
sume the mean of the cost distribution becomes higher in the sense of ﬁrst or-
der stochastic dominance. For example, the new distribution of cost is c ∈ U ∼
[c¯
′ − z, c¯′ + z], where c¯′ > c¯.
Proposition 2. A ﬁrst order stochastic dominance increase in the distribution of
cost will increase individual expected contribution and the total expected contribu-
tions.
Proof.
From (2.7), we know that K∗ = 1+c¯−z
n−1 +
2
(n−1)2 − 2(n−1)2
[
1 + (n− 1)(1 + c¯− z)
] 1
2
in
equilibrium. Diﬀerentiating (2.7) with respect to the mean of the cost uncertainty,
c, we can get
dK∗
dc¯
=
1
n− 1
{
1−
[
1 + (n− 1)(1 + c¯− z)
]−1
2
}
(2.14)
Since (c¯− z) is the lower bound of the threshold and assume (c¯− z) ≥ 0, [1 + (n−
1)(1 + c¯− z)]−12 will be less than 1. Thus, we can obtain dK∗
dc¯
> 0.
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Since ∂(nK
∗)
∂c¯
= n∂K
∗
∂c¯
and we have ∂K
∗
∂c¯
> 0, ∂nK
∗
∂c¯
> 0. Since the expected
contribution per player increases, so does the total expected contribution. 
The proposition indicates that players, on average, become more willing to con-
tribute to the public good when the mean cost of the public good becomes higher.
We have shown that the cutoﬀ point in equilibrium is vp = 1+
2
n−1
{
1− [1+ (n−
1)(1 + c¯ − z)] 12}. Since ∂vp
∂c¯
= −[1 + (n − 1)(1 + c¯ − z)]−12 < 0, increasing c¯ will
decrease the cutoﬀ point. This indicates that the player will begin contributing a
positive amount to the public good at a lower value as the mean of the cost increases.
The change in c¯ also aﬀects the player’s best response function where x∗ > 0.
This eﬀect can be divided into the direct eﬀect and the indirect eﬀect using the
player’s best response function, x∗, to demonstrate these two eﬀects.
∂x∗
∂c¯
=
−(n− 1)
2
∂K∗
∂c¯
+
1
2
(2.15)
=
{−1
2
+
1
2
[
1 + (n− 1)(1 + c¯− z)]−12 }+ 1
2
(2.16)
=
1
2
[
1 + (n− 1)(1 + c¯− z)]−12 > 0 (2.17)
From Equation (2.15), we ﬁnd that changing c¯ will change x∗ directly. Hence,
the second term in Equation (2.15) represents the direct eﬀect. Also, changing c¯
will aﬀect other players’ expected contributions, K∗. The ﬁrst term in Equation
(2.15) measures this eﬀect and represents the indirect eﬀect. Equation (2.16) shows
that increasing the mean of cost uncertainty induces the positive direct eﬀect, the
negative indirect eﬀect, and that the direct eﬀect dominates the indirect eﬀect. Thus,
increasing c¯ results in the increase of x∗.
We ﬁnd that players start to contribute to the public goods at a lower cutoﬀ
point value and the contribution amounts at each possible value of public good
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weakly increase. Hence, the expected contribution to the public good increases with
the mean of cost uncertainty, c¯.
This proposition provides the policy implication that if the suppliers are able to
increase the mean of the cost distribution, the private contribution to the public
good will increase. The increase in the mean cost will encourage the players with
low value to begin contributing to the public good and also increase contributions of
inframarginal contributors.
2.3.3 Numerical Example
In this subsection, we use two numerical examples to show that expected contri-
bution, K∗, increases in c¯, and decreases in z, respectively.
Example 1. (Mean-Preserving Spread)
In this example, we consider a subscription game with 5 players whose values are
uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. We also assume that players do not know the cost of
providing the public good but believe it follows a uniform distribution with support [1,
5], i.e. the initial c¯ = 3 and z = 2. If the cost distribution becomes more dispersed
in the sense of mean-preserving spread, such as z increases from 2 to 2.2, Figure 2.2
shows that the expected contribution is decreasing in z.
Example 2. (First-Order Stochastic Dominance)
Consider another subscription game with 5 players whose values for the public good
follow a common uniform distribution in [0, 1]. Players do not know the exact cost
of providing the public good but they believe that it is uniformly distributed in [0, 4],
that is, the initial c¯ = 2 and z = 2. If the cost of public good increases in the sense of
ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance, such as c¯ increases from 2 to 2.2, Figure 2.3 shows
that the expected contribution is increasing in c¯.
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Figure 2.2: Expected Contributions in the Example of Mean-Preserving Spread
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Figure 2.3: Expected Contributions in the Example of First-Order Stochastic Dom-
inance
2.4 Conclusion
If the valuation for the public good exhibits complete information to all players
and is identical for each player, McBride (2006) ﬁnds that the eﬀect of increased
cost uncertainty depends on the value of the public good. However, when we con-
sider public good valuations as private information, then expected contributions are
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monotonic, and a more dispersed cost distribution always decreases the expected
contributions. Moreover, we ﬁnd that increasing the mean of the public good in the
sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance will increase the expected contribution.
From a policy perspective, we suggest that suppliers can increase the private
contribution if they can either reduce the degree of uncertainty or increase the mean
with respect to the cost distribution when there exists both threshold uncertainty
and private information on public good valuations.
We oﬀer two directions for future research. Many real-world private contribution
institutions are not simultaneous, contributions are instead often collected sequen-
tially. For example, churches may announce organ fund campaigns and report the
updated contribution level frequently or local governments announce the seed do-
nations to future contributors when they launch new public good projects. There
is no published research that investigates how the sequential contribution would be
aﬀected by a change in the dispersion of the cost distribution or the value distribu-
tion in a subscription game under threshold uncertainty and private information of
valuation for the public good. A second research direction is to test the hypothesis
from our theoretical model using experimental methods in a laboratory environment.
These future studies may result in a more complete understanding of behavior in
mechanisms of private contribution to public goods.
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3. SEQUENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO A DISCRETE PUBLIC GOOD
UNDER THRESHOLD UNCERTAINTY AND PRIVATE INFORMATION
3.1 Motivation
An important class of public good allocation problems involves discrete or ﬁxed
quantity public goods. Typical examples of discrete public goods include parks, local
libraries, bridges, etc. Other interesting examples include: interest groups lobbying
to get a bill through Congress, and non-proﬁt organizations raising funds for non-
proﬁt agency events or projects. The cost of providing such a public good is often
called the threshold. Individuals would like to know the amount of money needed to
provide the public good when making contribution decisions; nevertheless, the cost
threshold may be uncertain in many situations. Suppliers have limited resources to
research the cost of completing a public goods project. For example, the exact cost of
construction may be unknown because biddings among potential contractors has not
been completed. Thus, threshold uncertainty is an important model consideration
in this paper.
In addition to threshold uncertainty, contributors often do not know whether
other contributors are willing to support the same project nor how much they value
the public good. Therefore, it is interesting to analyze the contribution equilibrium
assuming that valuation of the public good is private information.
Another important factor that may aﬀect the contribution behavior is the tim-
ing of the contribution. Many real-world public/private contribution institutions
do not receive contributions simultaneously. Contributions are instead made sequen-
tially and early contributions are often announced publicly. For example, universities
announce capital campaigns for new buildings and report the earlier contributions
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periodically on websites; churches may announce organ campaign targets and then
update the donations to the organ funds in the weekly bulletin.
In this paper, I introduce cost threshold uncertainty and private information on
public good valuations in a discrete public good subscription game and analyze the
following three questions: (1) How do individuals contribute to the public good in the
environment with private information and the cost uncertainty? (2) Do individuals
operating in diﬀerent contribution orders contribute diﬀerently? (3) Comparing se-
quential and simultaneous contribution institution, which institution produces higher
expected total contributions?
In the sequential contribution institution considered in this paper, each player
knows the total contributions made by the previous players before he/she makes
his/her own contribution decision. I also assume that players make contributions in
an exogenous sequence of mover and each player contributes only once. I derive the
Bayesian equilibrium for this sequential contribution model and ﬁnd that individ-
ual contribution increases with respect to the contribution order, that is, the earlier
contributors contribute less to the public good than the subsequent contributors do.
In addition, I oﬀer results of comparing the expected contributions in the sequential
and simultaneous contribution models. Results show that the expected total contri-
bution in the sequential contribution institution is less than that in the simultaneous
contribution institution.
In addition to considering both private information on valuation and the threshold
uncertainty in the primary model, I brieﬂy discuss cases considering only private
information on valuation or threshold uncertainty in a sequential subscription game.
I ﬁnd that controlling for the mean valuation, each player’s expected contribution
with private information on valuation and the threshold uncertainty is higher than
that with complete information on valuation and the threshold uncertainty. I also
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ﬁnd that controlling for the mean of the threshold distribution, each player’s expected
contribution with private information on valuation and the threshold uncertainty is
higher than that with private information on valuation and threshold certainty.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literatures related
to threshold uncertainty, private information and sequential contribution. My model
is presented in Section 3, followed by the comparisons of the expected contribution
in the sequential and simultaneous institutions in Section 4. I brieﬂy discuss the
cases with complete information on valuation and threshold uncertainty, with private
information on valuation and threshold certainty, and with no refund rule in Section
5. A conclusion is given in Section 6.
3.2 Literature Review
Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984), Bagnoli and Lipman (1989), investigate private
provision of a discrete public good. Both papers assume players simultaneously
make their contribution strategies in an environment with complete information on
the public good valuation and a certain known threshold level of cost, but they
consider diﬀerent types of contribution. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) assume the
player to make a binary contribution, whereas Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) allow
the player to make a continuous contribution. These two papers show that if the
full refund rule is introduced into the threshold public good game where players
simultaneously make their contribution, no eﬃcient Nash Equilibrium exists.
Admati and Perry (1991) investigate private provision of a discrete public good.
Instead of considering simultaneous contribution, they assume players contribute
”sequentially” in a subscription game (meaning that the contribution will be refunded
if the total contribution to the public good is not large enough to cover the ﬁxed
cost of providing the public good). They analyze a 2-player subscription game with
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complete information where these two players make alternate contribution decisions
until the total contribution is covered the cost threshold. They show that there is a
unique, eﬃcient subgame perfect equilibrium in the subscription game.
Nitzan and Romano (1990) extend Bagnoli and Lipman’s game by introducing
uncertainty regarding the cost of providing the public good and ﬁnd diﬀerent results.
The equilibrium is ineﬃcient because the uncertainty of the cost may cause the ex
post contributions to exceed or to fall short of the required threshold.
McBride (2006) focuses on investigating how the level of threshold uncertainty
aﬀects the players’ contributions. In his model, McBride assumes that each player
makes a binary contribution decision simultaneously and that the contribution will
not be refunded if the cost threshold is not met. He ﬁnds that instead of a monotonic
relationship between the degree of threshold uncertainty and total contributions, the
eﬀect of changing the threshold uncertainty on the contributions depends on the
value of the public good. An increase of threshold uncertainty in the sense of mean-
preserving spread increases the player’s contribution when the value of the public
good is suﬃciently high, but decreases the player’s contribution when the value of
the public good is suﬃciently low. McBride (2010) designs an experiment to test his
theory in a lab and ﬁnds limited veriﬁcation.
Papers by Menezes et al. (2001), Laussel and Palfrey (2003), and Barbieri and
Malueg (2008) introduce private information on the public good valuations into a
subscription game with a discrete public good and focus on examining the eﬃciency
of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Menezes et al. (2001) show that the equilibrium
in the subscription game is ex post ineﬃcient. Laussel and Palfrey (2003) analyze
interim incentive eﬃciency, deﬁned by Holmstro¨m and Myerson (1983), in the sub-
scription game. They ﬁnd that the interim incentive eﬃcient equilibrium may exist.
Later, Barbieri and Malueg (2008) reexamine Laussel and Palfrey’s analysis and show
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the contrary result that there is no incentive eﬃcient equilibrium.
Barbieri and Malueg (2010) include both the threshold uncertainty and private
information on valuations for a public good in the subscription game. They focus
on whether changing the intensity and dispersion of value distribution aﬀect players’
expected contributions. They ﬁnd that increasing the value distribution in the sense
of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance or dispersing the value distribution in the sense
of mean-preserving spread increases the expected contributions.
Barbieri and Malueg (2010) forms the basis for my model setting. The main
diﬀerence between my model and and Barbieri and Malueg’s is the timing of the
contribution mechanism. I focus on the sequential contribution, while Barbieri and
Malueg focus on the simultaneous contribution.
Gronberg and Peng (2014) consider both the threshold uncertainty and private
information on public good’s valuations in a subscription game and research the
eﬀects of changing the threshold distribution. They ﬁnd that increasing the mean
of the cost distribution in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance increases
individual expected contribution; while increasing the uncertainty level of the cost
in the sense of mean-preserving spread decreases individual expected contribution.
An early analysis of sequential contribution to a public good is provided by Varian
(1994). In a model with a continuous public good and complete information on public
good valuation, he ﬁnds that sequential contribution enables the early contributor
to free ride oﬀ the latter one and the total contribution under sequential institution
is lower than the total contribution under simultaneous institution. This ﬁnding
asserts that the leader in a sequential public good game tries to exploit the ﬁrst
mover advantage and leaves the burden of providing the public good to the following
contributors.
Ga¨chter et al. (2010) examines Varian’s prediction via a laboratory experiment.
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Their experimental result is consistent with the theoretical prediction that total
contribution is lower under sequential mechanism than simultaneous alternative when
contributors’ preferences are suﬃciently diﬀerent (but not too diﬀerent).
Bag and Roy (2011) extend Varian’s model and treat donors’ values of the public
good as private information. They show that the expected total contribution gener-
ated in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the sequential contribution game is at least
as large as that in a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous contribution
game. This occurs because when donors are uncertain about other players’ values
of the public good, the earlier donors may be cautious in free-riding on prospective
donors.
Unlike Varian’s model, Romano and Yildirim (2001) consider warm-glow eﬀect
noted by Andreoni (1989) as another contribution motivation in a sequential game.
In their model, the contributors are not only concerned with total contributions, but
also their own contribution level. With the warm-glow speciﬁcation, they ﬁnd that
the level of the public good in the sequential-move mechanism is higher than in the
simultaneous-move mechanism. Diﬀering from Romano and Yildirim’s (2001) model,
I assume that individuals are only concerned with total contribution to a public good
in this paper.
Cartwright and Patel (2010) suggest that the heterogeneity in individual behavior
may aﬀect the contribution in a sequential game. They ﬁnd that the strategists, who
behave strategically to maximize their own payoﬀs, will contribute to the public good
if they are early enough in the sequence and if they believe there are enough imitated
followers in a sequential game.
Andreoni (1998) focuses on the role of seed money in a discrete public good
sequential game setting. He demonstrates that adopting a sequential fundrais-
ing strategy can increase the likelihood of providing the public good when a cost
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threshold exists. This occurs because when contributors are not willing to cover the
cost single-handedly, simultaneous contribution may generate zero equilibrium. Se-
quential contribution can eliminate such ineﬃciency since announcing the previous
player’s donation can ensure that the latter player is willing to cover the remain-
ing cost. Subsequently, Bracha et al.(2011) test Andreoni’s theory experimentally
and ﬁnd that the experimental results are supportive of the theory when the cost
threshold is suﬃciently high.
Vesterlund (2003) considers a model in which the donors have common valuations
but the quality of the charity is unknown. She shows that larger gifts from early
donors prompt later donors to give higher donations. This motivates the high quality
charities to announce the earlier contributions to the public. In contrast to Vestlund’s
paper, contributors in my paper have independent private information on a public
good valuation. Thus, the results in this paper are not based on any informational
advantage or signaling value of announcement of contributions.
There are several experimental studies on continuous public goods (see Potters
et al.(2005), Masclet and Willinger (2005), Levati et al. (2007), Vyrestekova and
Garikipati (2008)) and discrete public goods (see Coats et al. (2009)). These papers
ﬁnd the sequential contribution is signiﬁcantly higher than the simultaneous contri-
bution when players have complete information on the distribution of valuations of
the public good.
3.3 Model
I consider a public good game with n ≥ 2 players who sequentially contribute any
non-negative amount to a discrete public good. Player i’s value for the public good is
shown by vi, i = 1, ..., n, and is an independently distributed random variable with a
continuous uniform distribution whose support is [0, 1]. With this assumption, each
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player’s valuation for the public good is private information, meaning that each player
knows his/her own realized value for the public good, but he/she is uncertain about
other players’ values for the public good. Let xi ∈ [0, vi] be player i’s contribution.
The discrete public good can be provided if and only if the total contributions
are equal to or larger than the cost of the public good, c, known as the cost thresh-
old. Suppose c is unknown when the players make their contribution decisions and
all players believe that the cost is independent of all vi’s and distributed along a
continuous uniform distribution, F , with support [0, c˜], where c˜ ≥ n. Barbieri and
Malueg (2010) show that in order to obtaining the unique equilibrium, the model
requires the assumption that c˜ ≥ n. Since Barbieri and Malueg (2010) is the basis
for my model, I use the same framework and maintain the same assumption in this
paper.
In this paper I consider the subscription public good game (Admati and Perry,
1991). Accordingly, the player’s contribution will be fully refunded if the total contri-
butions are less than the cost threshold, c. I also assume a zero rebate rule, meaning
the excess contributions will be given to the producer of the public good.
Players in this model make their contribution decisions sequentially. I assume
that the order of the move is exogenous. Each player contributes to the pubic good
only once. The total contribution is updated and announced to the public after
any player make his/her contribution decision. Thus, when a player makes his/her
contribution decision, he/she can observe the total accumulated contribution made
by the earlier players and must anticipate the contributions of prospective players.
Assume each player has a linear utility function
zi = wi − xi + gi(xi + x−i) (3.1)
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where, wi is player i’s wealth and
gi(xi + x−i) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
vi if xi + x−i ≥ c
xi if xi + x−i < c
(3.2)
If total contribution is larger than or equal to the cost threshold, c, the public good is
provided and player i receives vi with provision probability, pi; otherwise, the public
good is not provided and player i receives his/her own refunded contribution, xi.
Thus, player i’s expected utility function can be written as
Zi = E[zi] =
[
wi − xi + vi
]× pi + wi × (1− pi)
= wi + (vi − xi)× pi
= wi + Ui(xi|vi) (3.3)
where Ui(xi|vi) is player i’s expected payoﬀ from the public good.
Each player’s objective is to maximize his/her expected utility. However, in the
linear utility framework, maximizing the expected utility is the same as maximizing
the expected payoﬀ from the public good. Thus, in the following model, I assume
that each player’s objective is to maximize his/her expected payoﬀ from the public
good, Ui(xi|vi).
Since the player contributes to the public good sequentially, he/she does not know
what contribution the subsequent players will make and has to calculate their ex-
pected contributions. Because the contribution order is diﬀerent for each player, the
number of remaining players is diﬀerent for each player. For example, the ﬁrst player
in a 3-player game needs to expect the second and the third player’s contributions;
but, the second player can observe the ﬁrst player’s contribution and only needs to
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expect the third player’s contribution. Hence, the probability of providing the public
good each player faces, pi, is diﬀerent. Depending on the sequence, players’ expected
payoﬀ functions can be written as:
Player 1’s expected payoﬀ function is:
U1(x1|v1) = (v1 − x1)
[x1 + E1[x2] + E1[x3] + ...+ E1[xn]
c˜
]
(3.4)
where E1[xj ], j = 2..., n is the contribution Player 1 expects Player j to make.
Player 2’s expected payoﬀ function is:
U2(x2|v2) = (v2 − x2)
[x1 + x2 + E2[x3] + E2[x4] + ...+ E2[xn]
c˜
]
(3.5)
where E2[xk], k = 3..., n is the contribution Player 2 expects Player k to make.
...
...
Player n’s expected payoﬀ function is:
Un(xn|vn) = (vn − xn)
[x1 + x2 + ... + xn−1 + xn
c˜
]
(3.6)
Since Player n is the last player in an n-player game, he/she does not anticipate any
other player’s contribution.
From Equation (3.4) to Equation (3.6), I arrive at the expected payoﬀ function
of Player i (the i-th player in the game) is:
Ui(xi|vi) = (vi − xi)
[∑i−1
l=1 xl + xi +
∑n
m=i+1 Ei[xm]
c˜
]
(3.7)
where
∑i−1
l=1 xl is the total contribution made by the player who acts before Player i,
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and Ei[xm] is the contribution that Player i expects Player m to make.
3.3.1 Best Response Function
To derive each player’s best response function in the sequential game, I use the
method of backward induction. For simplicity, I start with a 2-player case.
2-player case
There are two players, Player 1 and Player 2. Player 1 makes his/her contribution
decision ﬁrst and Player 2 makes his/her contribution decision subsequently. Thus,
Player 1’s expected payoﬀ function is
U1(x1|v1) = (v1 − x1)
[x1 + E1[x2]
c˜
]
(3.8)
and Player 2’s expected payoﬀ function is
U2(x2|v2) = (v2 − x2)
[x1 + x2
c˜
]
(3.9)
By the method of backward induction, I discuss Player 2’s behavior ﬁrst.
Maximizing Equation (3.9) with respect to x2 and taking the ﬁrst order condition
(F.O.C), I get:
∂U2
∂x2
=
−1
c˜
(x1 + x2) +
1
c˜
(v2 − x2) = 0
=⇒ x2 = v2 − x1
2
(3.10)
It yields Player 2’s best response function:
x2 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if 0 ≤ v2 ≤ x1
v2−x1
2
if x1 ≤ v2 ≤ 1
(3.11)
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From Equation (3.11), I ﬁnd that v2 = x1 is the cutoﬀ point for Player 2 to begin
contributing to the public good in the 2-player case. In other words, Player 2 is
willing to contribute a positive amount to the public good when his/her value is
equal to or larger than the cutoﬀ point, x1. Also, Equation (3.11) shows that once
Player 2’s contribution is positive, it is strictly increasing in his/her value of the
public good and strictly decreasing in Player 1’s contribution.
Next, I solve for Player 1’s behavior. Since Player 1 cannot observe Player 2’s
contribution when he/she makes his/her contribution decision, he/she has to cal-
culate Player 2’s expected contribution, namely E1[x2] in Equation (3.8). Consider
Player 2’s value, v2, which follows a uniform distribution with [0, 1] and his/her best
response function, Equation (3.11), Player 2’s expected contribution Player 1 expects
is
E1
[
x2
]
=
∫ x1
0
0dv2 +
∫ 1
x1
[v2 − x1
2
]
dv2
E1
[
x2
]
=
1
4
− x1
2
+
x21
4
(3.12)
Substitute Equation (3.12) into Equation (3.8), Player 1’s expected payoﬀ func-
tion can be rewritten as
U1(x1|v1) =
(
v1 − x1
)( 1
4
+ x1
2
+
x21
4
c˜
)
(3.13)
Maximizing Player 1’s expected payoﬀ function, Equation (3.13), and taking the
ﬁrst order condition (F.O.C), I get:
∂U1
∂x1
=
−1
c˜
(1
4
+
x1
2
+
x21
4
)
+
1
c˜
(v1 − x1)(1
2
+
x1
2
) = 0
=⇒ x1 = 2v1 − 1
3
(3.14)
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It yields Player 1’s best response function:
x1 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if 0 ≤ vL < 12
2v1−1
3
if 1
2
≤ vL ≤ 1
(3.15)
From Equation (3.15), I ﬁnd that v1 =
1
2
is the cutoﬀ point for Player 1 to begin
contributing to the public good in the 2-player case. In other words, Player 1 is
willing to contribute a positive amount to the public good when his/her value is
equal to or larger than the cutoﬀ point, 1
2
. Also, Equation (3.15) shows that once
Player 1’s contribution is positive, it is strictly increasing in his/her value of the
public good.
3-player case
Assume there are three players in a subscription game. Player 1 makes his/her
contribution decision ﬁrst and is followed by Player 2. Finally, Player 3 makes
his/her contribution decision.
Player 1’s expected payoﬀ function is
U1(x1|v1) = (v1 − x1)
[x1 + E1[x2] + E1[x3]
c˜
]
(3.16)
Player 2’s expected payoﬀ function is
U2(x2|v2) = (v2 − x2)
[x1 + x2 + E2[x3]
c˜
]
(3.17)
and Player 3’s expected function is
U3(x3|v3) = (v3 − x3)
[x1 + x2 + x3
c˜
]
(3.18)
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Using the same basic method I use to solve the 2-player case, I get each player’s
best response function:
Player 3’s best response function is
x3 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if 0 ≤ v3 ≤ (x1 + x2),
v3−(x1+x2)
2
if (x1 + x2) ≤ v3 ≤ 1
(3.19)
Player 2’s best response function is
x2 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if 0 ≤ v2 ≤ 1+x12 ,
2v2−x1−1
3
if 1+x1
2
≤ v2 ≤ 1
(3.20)
Player 1’s best response function is
x1 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if 0 ≤ v1 < 23 ,
3v1−2
4
if 2
3
≤ v1 ≤ 1
(3.21)
Following the same procedure in the 2-player and the 3-player case and using the
method of induction, I derive each player’s best response function in a n-player case.
The best response function of Player i, who is the i-th player in the n-player case,
can be written as
xi =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if 0 ≤ vi ≤ (n−i)+
∑
p<i xp
(n+1−i) ,
(n+1−i)vi−(n−i)−
∑
p<i xp
n+2−i if
(n−i)+∑p<i xp
(n+1−i) ≤ vi ≤ 1
(3.22)
Player i’s best response function, Equation (3.22), shows that the higher the
player’s valuation for the public good is, the higher the contribution Player i will
make. But, the higher the total contribution made by the earlier players, the lower
the contribution Player i will make.
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3.3.2 Bayesian Equilibrium
Since players have independent private information on valuations for a public
good, the solution concept is Bayesian equilibrium. In this subsection, I explain how
to arrive at the Bayesian Equilibrium.
2-player case
In the 2-player case I mentioned in the previous subsection, Equation (3.11) and
Equation (3.15) represent Player 1 and Player 2 best response functions, respectively.
Using these best response functions, I ﬁnd each player’s equilibrium strategy. From
Equation (3.15), Player 1’s equilibrium strategies are
x∗1 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if 0 ≤ vL < 12
2v1−1
3
if 1
2
≤ vL ≤ 1
(3.23)
Thus, Player 1’s Bayesian equilibrium, also known as the ex ante expected con-
tribution, is:
E[x∗1] =
∫ 1
2
0
0 dv1 +
∫ 1
1
2
2v1 − 1
3
dv1
=⇒ E[x1] = 1
12
(3.24)
Using Equation (3.23) and Player 2’s best response function, Equation (3.11),
yields Player 2’s equilibrium strategies:
• 1. if Player 1’s equilibrium is x∗1 = 0
x∗2 =
v2
2
∀v2 (3.25)
35
• 2. if Player 1’s equilibrium is x∗1 = 2v1−13
x2 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if 0 ≤ v2 ≤ 2v1−13
3v2−2v1+1
6
if 2v1−1
3
≤ v2 ≤ 1
(3.26)
According to Player 2’ equilibrium strategies, Equation (3.25) and Equation
(3.26), his/her Bayesian equilibrium is
E[x∗2] =
∫ 1
2
0
∫ 1
0
v2
2
dv2dv1 +
∫ 1
1
2
∫ 1
2v1−1
3
3v2 − 2v1 + 1
3
dv2dv1
=⇒ E[x∗2] =
1
8
+
23
108
=
8
27
(3.27)
3-player case
Using the best response functions I ﬁnd in the last subsection, Equation (3.19) to
Equation (3.21), I calculate each player’s equilibrium strategy and his/her expected
contribution.
Based on Player 1’s best response function, Equation (3.21), his/her equilibrium
strategies are
x∗1 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if 0 ≤ v1 < 23 ,
3v1−2
4
if 2
3
≤ v1 ≤ 1
(3.28)
Thus, Player 1’s ex ante expected contribution is calculated from Equation (3.28),
and can be written as
E[x∗1] =
∫ 2
3
0
0 dv1 +
∫ 1
2
3
3v1 − 2
4
dv1
=⇒ E[x1] = 1
24
(3.29)
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Using Equation (3.28) and Player 2’s best response function, Equation (3.20),
yields Player 2’s equilibrium strategies:
• 1. if Player 1’s equilibrium is x∗1 = 0
x2 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if 0 ≤ v2 ≤ 12
2v2−1
3
if 1
2
≤ v2 ≤ 1
(3.30)
• 2. if Player 1’s equilibrium is x∗1 = 3v1−24
x2 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if 0 ≤ v2 ≤ 3v1+28
8v2−3v1−2
12
if 3v1+2
8
≤ v2 ≤ 1
(3.31)
Using Equation (3.30) and Equation (3.31), I get Player 2’s Bayesian equilibrium:
E[x∗2] =
∫ 2
3
0
∫ 1
1
2
2v2 − 1
3
dv2dv1 +
∫ 1
2
3
∫ 1
3v1+2
8
8v2 − 3v1 − 2
12
dv2dv1
=⇒ E[x∗2] =
1
18
+
37
1728
=
133
1728
(3.32)
Based on Player 1 and Player 2’s strategies and Player 3’s best response function,
Equation (3.19), I get Player 3’s equilibrium strategies:
• 1. if Player 1’s equilibrium is x∗1 = 0 and if Player 2’s equilibrium is x∗2 = 0:
x∗3 =
v3
2
∀v3 (3.33)
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• 2. if Player 1’s equilibrium is x∗1 = 0 and if Player 2’s equilibrium is x∗2 = 2v2−13 :
x∗3 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if 0 ≤ v3 ≤ 2v2−13 ,
3v3−v2+1
6
if 2v2−1
3
≤ v3 ≤ 1
(3.34)
• 3. if Player 1’s equilibrium is x∗1 = 3v1−24 and if Player 2’s equilibrium is x∗2 = 0:
x∗3 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if 0 ≤ v3 ≤ 3v1−24 ,
4v3−3v1+2
8
if 3v1−2
4
≤ v3 ≤ 1
(3.35)
• 4. if Player 1’s equilibrium is x∗1 = 3v1−24 and if Player 2’s equilibrium is
x∗2 =
2v2−1
3
:
x∗3 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if 0 ≤ v3 ≤ 3v1+4v2−46 ,
3v1+4v2−4
6
6v3−3v1−4v2+4
12
if ≤ v3 ≤ 1
(3.36)
Using Equation (3.33) to Equation (3.36), I get Player 3’s Bayesian equilibrium:
E[x∗3] =
∫ 2
3
0
∫ 1
2
0
∫ 1
0
v3
2
dv3dv2dv1 +
∫ 2
3
0
∫ 1
1
2
∫ 1
2v2−1
3
3v3 − v2 + 1
6
dv3dv2dv1
+
∫ 1
2
3
∫ 3v1+2
8
0
∫ 1
3v1−2
4
4v3 − 3v1 + 2
8
dv3dv2dv1
+
∫ 1
2
3
∫ 1
3v1+2
8
∫ 1
3v1+4v2−4
6
6v3 − 3v1 − 4v2 + 4
12
dv3dv2dv1
=⇒ E[x∗3] =
1
12
+
19
324
+
659
18432
+
3325
165888
=
4101
20736
(3.37)
To solve the n-player case, I adopt the method used in the 2-player and the
3-player cases; however, it is complicated and diﬃcult to solve for the Bayesian equi-
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librium in a case with large number of players. This is because a player’s equilibrium
strategies I need to derive increase with the number of players in the subscription
game.
For example, to solve the Bayesian equilibrium of the last player in an n-player
game, I need to derive his/her equilibrium strategies ﬁrst. According to (n − 1)
earlier players’ strategy combinations, there are 2n−1 diﬀerent groups of Player n’s
equilibrium strategies. Next, I have to calculate the multiple integrals over v1, ..., vn
and to get the expected contributions in these 2n−1 diﬀerent groups. The last step
to get the nth player’s Bayesian equilibrium is to sum the expected contributions in
these 2n−1 diﬀerent groups. Due to the complication of deriving the Bayesian equi-
librium directly, I use the method of simulation to analyze the Bayesian equilibrium
in a game with a larger number of players.
In the following paragraphs, I describe how to simulate the Bayesian equilibrium
in this paper explicitly. I divide each player’s valuation into 1001 ”units” from 0
to 1. That is, a player’s value may be 0, 0.001, 0.002, ..., 1. Player 1 makes his/her
contribution depending on his/her best response function and his/her valuation for
the public good. Since there are 1001 possible values for Player 1, I get 1001 x∗1.
Then, summing these 1001 x∗1 and dividing by 1001, I will get Player 1’s expected
contribution.
When Player 2 makes his/her contribution, he/she will not only consider his/her
own best response function and his/her valuation for the public good but also con-
siders the contribution made by Player 1. Since there are 1001 diﬀerent Player 2’s
values for the public good and 1001 x∗1, I get 1001
2 x∗2. I sum these 1001
2 x∗2 and
divide by 10012, arriving at Player 2’s expected contribution.
Thus, to calculate the i-th player’s expected contribution in an n-player game,
I, ﬁrst, get 1001i x∗i according to Player i’s possible valuation for the public good
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and the contribution made by the players who contribute earlier. Then, Player i’s
expected contribution is calculated by summing up these 1001i x∗i and dividing by
1001i.
Figure 3.1 shows the simulation results of each player’s expected contribution
in the 2-player to 7-player sequential contribution cases. I ﬁnd that the expected
contribution increases in the order of movement in these 4 cases.
This result demonstrates that the earlier contributors can free ride oﬀ the sub-
sequent contributors in the sequential contribution institution and they enjoy the
ﬁrst-mover advantage by contributing smaller amounts to the public good, relying
on other contributors to provide the public good on their own. Thus, the order of
contributing to the public good plays an important role to the contributors.
Another ﬁnding is that the gap between the ﬁrst player’s and the last player’s
expected contribution increases in the number of players in the game. For example,
in the 2-player case, the ﬁrst player’s expected contribution is one third of the last
player’s expected contribution; but, in the 5-player case, the ﬁrst player’s expected
contribution is only one tenth of the last player’s expected contribution. This result
shows that the free-riding problem becomes more serious when the number of players
contribute to the public good in a subscription game gets larger.
3.4 Comparison of the Expected Contribution
Except for the institution of contribution, the model setting in this paper is
similar to that in Barbieri and Malueg (2010). My approach in this section is to
compare the expected contribution under sequential contribution with the expected
contribution under simultaneous contribution.
Before comparing the results of these two contribution institutions, I brieﬂy in-
troduce Barbieri and Malueg’s model and equilibrium result. Their model setting is
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Figure 3.1: Expected Contribution per Player in the Sequential Contribution
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Figure 3.1 continued.
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the same as the model in this paper: player’s value is private information and follows
a common uniform distribution with support [0, 1]; the cost threshold of providing
the public good is uncertain and follows an uniform distribution with support [0, c˜],
where c˜ ≥ n. The only diﬀerence between Barbieri and Malueg (2010) and this pa-
per is that players make their contribution decisions simultaneously in Barbieri and
Malueg (2010), while players make their contribution decisions sequentially in this
paper. Player’s expected contribution in Barbieri and Malueg (2010) can be written
as
K = E
[
max
{
0,
1
2
[
vi − (n− 1)K
]}]
=⇒ K∗ = 1
n− 1 +
2
(n− 1)2
[
1− n 12
]
(3.38)
Thus, the expected contribution in Barbieri and Malueg’s simultaneous model is a
symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.
Figure 3.2 shows each player’s sequential and simultaneous expected contribu-
tions in the 2-payer to 7-player case. I ﬁnd that the ﬁrst (n − 1) players’ expected
contributions in the sequential contribution model are lower than that in the si-
multaneous contribution model, but the last player’s expected contribution in the
sequential contribution model is higher than that in the simultaneous contribution
model.
Figure 3.3 displays expected total contribution in the sequential and simultaneous
contribution models. It shows that the expected total contribution in the sequential
model is lower than that in the simultaneous contribution model when 2 to 7 players
participate in the subscription game. It also shows that the gap between the expected
total contribution in these two models is increasing in the number of players. This
is because the increment of the expected total contribution in the sequential model
is smaller than that in the simultaneous model.
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tribution Model
Figures 3.2 and Figure 3.3 show that although the last player’s expected contribu-
tion in the sequential model is higher than that in the simultaneous model, it is not
large enough to cover the decrease of the ﬁrst (n−1) players’ expected contributions.
Thus the expected total contribution in the sequential model is lower.
Due to the model setting, c˜ ≥ n, increasing the number of players increases
the upper bound of threshold distribution. To compare the ex ante probability of
providing the public good, I assume that c˜ = n in an n-player case. With this
assumption, the cost of public good provision per player is unchanged, which is
equal to 1. Figure 3.4 illustrates the ex ante probability of providing the public good
in a 2-player case to a 7-player case. It shows that the ex ante probability in the
sequential model is lower than that in the simultaneous model.
Figure 3.4 also shows that whether players contribute to a public good in the
sequential institution or in the simultaneous institution, the ex ante probability is
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Figure 3.4: Ex Ante Probability in the Sequential and Simultaneous Contribution
Model
decreasing in the number of players even if the cost of public good provision per
player is unchanged.
3.5 Other Considerations
In this section, I brieﬂy discuss the equilibria in the diﬀerent theoretical environ-
ments. The ﬁrst case I will discuss is based on the assumption that players have
complete information but still face the threshold uncertainty when making contri-
bution decisions. The second case that I focus on assumes that players have private
information on valuation but they know the exact cost of providing the public good
when contributing to the public good. Besides private information on valuation and
threshold uncertainty, an important assumption in the primary model is the full re-
funded rule. Another special case discussed in this section centers on the assumption
that there is no refund rule rather than the full refund rule if the total contribution
does not cover the cost of providing the public good.
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3.5.1 Complete Information on Valuation and Threshold Uncertainty
I consider a 4-player case and assume that the valuation of the public good, v,
is common knowledge and is the same for each player. As to the cost of providing
the public good, I assume it is unknown when the players make their contribution
decisions, independent of v and follows the uniform distribution, c ∼ U [0, c˜], where
c˜ ≥ n. This assumption is the same as the assumption in the primary model. In this
case, the i-th player’s expected payoﬀ function can be written as
Ui(xi|v) =
(
v − xi
)[∑4j=1 xj
c˜
]
(3.39)
Using the method of backward induction, I derive the Subgame Perfect Equilib-
rium. For Player 4, his/her expected payoﬀ function is
U4(x4|v) =
(
v − x4
)[x1 + x2 + x3 + x4
c˜
]
(3.40)
To maximize Player 4’s expected payoﬀ, I get his/her best response function
x4 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if v ≤ x1 + x2 + x3
v−x1−x2−x3
2
if v ≥ x1 + x2 + x3
(3.41)
If x4 =
v−x1−x2−x3
2
(this implies v ≥ x1+x2+x3), then Player 3’s expected payoﬀ
function can be written as
U3(x3|v) =
(
v − x3
)[v + x1 + x2 + x3
2c˜
]
(3.42)
From Equation (3.42)
∂U3
∂x3
=
−x1 − x2 − 2x3
2c˜
< 0 (3.43)
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This indicates that the smaller x3 is, the higher U3 is. Thus, Player 3’s best response
function is x3 = 0.
If x3 = 0 and x4 =
v−x1−x2−x3
2
, Player 2’ expected payoﬀ function can be written
as
U2(x2|v) =
(
v − x2
)[v + x1 + x2
2c˜
]
(3.44)
From Equation (3.44)
∂U2
∂x2
=
−x1 − 2x2
2c˜
< 0 (3.45)
This indicates that the smaller x2 is, the higher U2 is. Thus, Player 2’s best response
function is x2 = 0.
If x2 = 0, x3 = 0 and x4 =
v−x1−x2−x3
2
, Player 1’ expected payoﬀ function can be
written as
U1(x1|v) =
(
v − x1
)[v + x1
2c˜
]
(3.46)
From Equation (3.46)
∂U1
∂x1
=
−x1
c˜
< 0 (3.47)
This indicates that the smaller x1 is, the higher U1 is. Thus, Player 1’s best re-
sponse function is x1 = 0. Based on each player’s best response function, I derive
the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: when v ≥ 0, x∗1 = x∗2 = x∗3 = 0 and x∗4 = v2 .
This Subgame Perfect Equilibrium shows that the higher the valuation of the public
good is the higher the last player’s contribution is; however, the ﬁrst n− 1 player’s
contribution is independent of the valuation. That is, the ﬁrst n − 1 player always
contribute zero to the public good. Using the same process I get a trivial Subgame
Perfect Equilibrium: when v ≤ 0, x∗1 = x∗2 = x∗3 = x∗4 = 0.
In order to compare the result in this case with the results in the primary model
(public good’s valuation is private information and followed a uniform distribution
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with support [0, 1]), I let v = 1
2
in this new case. That is, v equals to the mean of value
distribution in the main model. I assume the threshold distribution is c ∼ U [0, 4].
Thus, the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in this 4-player case is x∗1 = x
∗
2 = x
∗
3 = 0
and x∗4 =
1
4
. From the equilibrium, I observe that when the public good’s valuation
is known and the threshold is uncertain, the ﬁrst three players are not willing to
contribute to the public good and the last player will contribute half of his/her
valuation to the public good. This result suggests that the ﬁrst three players rely on
the last player to contribute to the public good and enjoy the ﬁrst-mover advantage.
Thus, there exists the free rider problem.
Table 3.1 shows the comparison of equilibria under diﬀerent value information
settings.
Table 3.1: Comparison of Equilibria under Diﬀerent Value Information
complete information incomplete information
v = 1
2
v ∼ U [0, 1]
x1 = 0 E
∗[x1] = 0.025
threshold x2 = 0 E
∗[x2] = 0.039
uncertainty x3 = 0 E
∗[x3] = 0.074
c ∼ U [0, 4] x4 = 0.25 E∗[x4] = 0.189
total = 0.25 total = 0.327
In the primary model, which considers private information on valuation and
threshold uncertainty, the Bayesian Equilibrium in a 4-player case is E∗[x1] = 0.025,
E∗[x2] = 0.039, E∗[x3] = 0.074, and E∗[x4] = 0.189. Comparing this initial result
with the result in this subsection, I ﬁnd that whether the public goods’s valuation is
private information or complete information, the last player contributes the most to
the public good and a free rider problem exists in both cases.
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Since the valuation in the case of this subsection equals to the mean of valuation
distribution in the main model, the contribution equilibrium results show that keep-
ing the mean of valuation the same, when the degree of valuation dispersion shrinks
to be zero, the free rider problem becomes more serious. This is because the earlier
contributors can predict the latter contributors’ contributions more accurately when
the valuation of the public good is complete information. This result suggests that
the early contributors enjoy a stronger ﬁrst-mover advantage and rely more on the
last player to provide the public good.
3.5.2 Private Information on Valuation and Threshold Certainty
Next, I discuss another case when the cost of providing the public good, c, is
certain and known when players make their contribution decisions. As to the valua-
tion of the public good, I assume each player’s valuation of public good, v, is private
information and followed a common uniform distribution, v ∼ U [0, 1]. I discuss this
particular theoretical setting via a 4-player case.
The i-th player’s expected payoﬀ function in this game can be written
Ui(xi|vi) = (vi − xi)Qi (3.48)
Qi represents the probability of providing the public good for Player i and it is equal
to
Qi =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if
∑i−1
l=1 xl + xi +
∑n
m=i+1Ei[xm] ≤ c
1 if
∑i−1
l=1 xl + xi +
∑n
m=i+1Ei[xm] ≥ c
where
∑i−1
l=1 xl represents the total contributions made by the players whose contribu-
tion sequence is prior to Player i’s and Ei[xm] is the subsequent Player m’s expected
contribution that Player i expects. If the total (expected) contribution is equal to or
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larger than the provision cost, c, the public good can be provided. That is, Qi = 1 if
the provision cost is met; otherwise, the public good cannot be provided, or Qi = 0.
From Equation (3.48), Player 4’s expected payoﬀ function can be written
U4(x4|v4) =
(
v4 − x4
)
Q4 (3.49)
Q4 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 ≤ c
1 if x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 ≥ c
To maximize Player 4’s expected payoﬀ, I get his/her best response function
x4 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if v4 ≤ c− x1 − x2 − x3
c− x1 − x2 − x3 if v4 ≥ c− x1 − x2 − x3
(3.50)
Assume c− x1 − x2 − x3 ≥ 1, I get the contribution Player 3 expects Player 4 to
make, seen below:
E3[x4] = 0 (3.51)
For Player 3, his/her expected payoﬀ function can be written
U3(x3|v3) =
(
v3 − x3
)
Q3 (3.52)
Q3 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if x1 + x2 + x3 + E3[x4] ≤ c
1 if x1 + x2 + x3 + E3[x4] ≥ c
Using Player 3’s expected payoﬀ function, I derive his/her best response function
x3 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if v3 ≤ c− x1 − x2
c− x1 − x2 if v3 ≥ c− x1 − x2
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If x3 = c−x1−x2, then c−x1−x2−x3 becomes c−x1−x2−(c−x1−x2) = 0 < 1
which contradicts the condition c−x1−x2−x3 ≥ 1. Thus, x3 = c−x1−x2 cannot be
Player 3’s best response function given the case with the condition c−x1−x2−x3 ≥ 1.
Therefore, Player 3’s best response function should be
x3 = 0 ∀v3 (3.53)
Based on Player 3 and 4’s best response function, the contributions Player 2 expects
Player 3 and 4 to make are E2[x3] = 0 and E2[x4] = 0.
Similarly, I get Player 2’s expected payoﬀ function
U2(x2|v2) =
(
v2 − x2
)
Q2 (3.54)
Q2 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if x1 + x2 + E2[x3] + E2[x4] ≤ c
1 if x1 + x2 + E2[x3] + E2[x4] ≥ c
Using the same procedure, I derive Player 2’s best response function, which in
this case is:
x2 = 0 ∀v2 (3.55)
According to Equation (3.50), (3.53) and (3.55) and the condition, c− x1 − x2 −
x3 ≥ 1, I get what Player 1 expects Player 2, Player 3, and Player 4’s contribution
are E1[x2], E1[x3] = 0 and E1[x4] = 0. Thus, Player 1’s expected payoﬀ function is
U1(x1|v1) =
(
v1 − x1
)
Q1 (3.56)
Q1 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if x1 + E1[x2] + E1[x3] + E1[x4] ≤ c
1 if x1 + E1[x2] + E1[x3] + E1[x4] ≥ c
53
and his/her best response function should be
x1 = 0 ∀v1 (3.57)
Using each player’s best response function, I derive the Bayesian Equilibrium
E∗[x1] = E∗[x2] = E∗[x3] = E∗[x4] = 0, when c ≥ 1.
To compare the result in this case with the results in the primary model, which
assumes the provision cost is unknown when players make contribution decisions and
followed a uniform distribution, c ∼ U [0, c˜], c˜ ≥ n, I assume the provision cost in
this new case equals to c˜
2
. Also, I assume the upper bound of the possible cost, c˜,
is 4. Thus, the main diﬀerences between the case in this subsection and the case in
the primary model are that the provision cost in the previous one equals to 2 and
the provision cost in the latter one follows the distribution, c ∼ U [0, 4].
Table 3.2 shows the comparison of equilibria under diﬀerent cost distribution set-
tings. Based on this numerical setting, the Bayesian Equilibrium when the provision
cost is certain, known and equals to 2 is E∗[x1] = E∗[x2] = E∗[x3] = E∗[x4] = 0 since
the provision cost is larger than 1. As to the Bayesian Equilibrium in a 4-player case
when assuming private information on valuation and threshold uncertainty, it can
be shown that E∗[x1] = 0.025, E∗[x2] = 0.039, E∗[x3] = 0.074, and E∗[x4] = 0.189.
Table 3.2: Comparison of Equilibria in Diﬀerent Threshold Uncertainty
no threshold uncertainty threshold uncertainty
(c = 2) (c ∼ U [0, 4])
E∗[x1] = 0 E∗[x1] = 0.025
incomplete E∗[x2] = 0 E∗[x2] = 0.039
information E∗[x3] = 0 E∗[x3] = 0.074
v ∼ U [0, 1] E∗[x4] = 0 E∗[x4] = 0.189
total = 0 total = 0.327
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Comparing the case in this subsection with the case in the primary model, I ﬁnd
that keeping the mean of the cost threshold the same, if the degree of threshold
dispersion shrinks to be zero, each player’s expected contribution decreases to zero.
One explanation for this result is that the threshold in this particular numerical case
may be too high, so the players, on average, are not willing to contribute to the
public good. Each player’s average valuation is 1
2
and the threshold is 2 in this new
case. If each player is burdened with the same share of the threshold, this means
the players should, on average, contribute 1
2
to provide the public good. However,
the player whose valuation is lower than 1
2
must contribute the amount lower than
1
2
; and the player whose valuation is higher than 1
2
will not contribute the amount
equals to his/her valuation. Thus, each player’s contribution, on average, is lower
than 1
2
. This result suggests that the public good may not be provided, so each
player’s expected contribution is equal to zero.
Another reason the expected contribution is higher in the primary model is that
if the true cost is low and the public good is provided, the players get a positive
payoﬀ. If the true cost is high and the public good cannot be provided, the con-
tributions will be fully refunded. Thus, the contributors know that contributing to
the public good will not make them worse oﬀ and they may get a positive payoﬀ
when threshold uncertainty exists. Thus, whether the provision order is, the player’s
expected contribution under the threshold uncertainty is higher than that under the
threshold certainty.
3.5.3 No Refunded Rule
In this subsection, I will discuss another particular model setting — a no refund
rule in a 3 player case. Keeping other assumptions in the model unchanged but
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considering the no refunded rule, Player 3’s expected payoﬀ can be written as
U3(x3|v3) = v3
[x1 + x2 + x3
c˜
]
− x3 (3.58)
From Equation (3.58)
∂U3
∂x3
=
v3
c˜
− 1 (3.59)
Since I assume that c˜ ≥ n(= 3 in this case), and 0 ≤ v3 ≤ 1, I can get ∂U3∂x3 < 0. This
means that the more Player 3 contributes, the less his/her expected payoﬀ is. Thus,
Player 3’s best response function is
x3 = 0 ∀v3 (3.60)
and Player 3’s expected contribution is
E[x3] =
∫ 1
0
0 dv3 = 0 (3.61)
For Player 2, his/her expected utility function is
U2(x2|v2) = v2
[x1 + x2 + E2[x3]
c˜
]
− x2
= v2
[x1 + x2
c˜
]
− x2 (3.62)
then, Player 2’s best response function is
x2 = 0 ∀v2 (3.63)
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and Player 2’s expected contribution is
E[x2] =
∫ 1
0
0 dv2 = 0 (3.64)
Similarly, Player 1’s expected payoﬀ function can be written as
U1(x1|v1) = v1
[x1 + E1[x2] + E1[x3]
c˜
]
− x1
= v1
[x1
c˜
]
− x1 (3.65)
then his/her best response function is
x1 = 0 ∀v1 (3.66)
and his/her expected contribution is
E[x1] =
∫ 1
0
0 dv1 = 0 (3.67)
From this example, I ﬁnd that if the player’s contribution cannot be refunded
when the public good is not provided, his/her expected contribution is zero regardless
of the order he holds in the sequence. Thus, with the zero refund rule, contributors
are afraid that they cannot make a high enough contribution to cover the cost of
the public good and will thus suﬀer a loss from contributing. This results in zero
contribution to the public good.
Comparing the results in the full refund case to that in the no refund case, I ﬁnd
that using the full refund rule can encourage individuals to contribute to the public
good. This is because contributors know that making a contribution will not make
them worse oﬀ with the full refund rule.
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3.6 Conclusion
This paper considers private information on public good valuations and threshold
uncertainty in a sequential contribution mechanism and derives the Bayesian equi-
librium. I ﬁnd that expected contributions are increasing with respect to contributor
order in this sequential contribution institution. The pattern of earlier movers free
ride oﬀ later mover and enjoy the ﬁrst-mover advantage in the Bayesian equilibrium
to the private information game mirrors the predicted pattern of play under subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium and complete information.
This paper compares the player’s expected contribution in the sequential con-
tribution mechanism and that in Barbieri and Malueg’s (2010) simultaneous con-
tribution mechanism. I ﬁnd that the expected total contribution in the sequential
institution is lower than that in the simultaneous institution. Also, the ex ante pro-
vision probability in the sequential institution is lower than that in the simultaneous
institution.
Using the simple 4-player case, I ﬁnd that if the degree of valuation dispersion
shrinks to zero, the total contribution will becomes lower and the free rider problem
becomes more serious. This is because the earlier contributors rely more on the last
player’s contribution and enjoy stronger ﬁrst-mover advantage. I also ﬁnd that if the
degree of threshold dispersion shrinks to zero, the total expected is lower than that
with threshold uncertainty.
Future researchers could analyze changes in the threshold distribution. I have
investigated how the changing of the threshold distribution aﬀects player’s expected
contribution in the simultaneous contribution model. I am interested in this same
question in the sequential contribution model. However, if I adopt the same model
setting I use in the simultaneous model may result in numerous and complicated
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cases. It will be very diﬃcult to analyze the same question. I am still looking for
some more clever methods to investigate this issue.
Another direction is to test the theoretical private contribution predictions using
a lab experiment. I propose from the theoretical model, for example, that the ex-
pected total contribution in a sequential contribution institution is low than that in
the simultaneous institution and early contributors may free ride oﬀ of prospective
contributors. Future research could test this theoretical prediction in a laboratory
setting. This could help us to understand how diﬀerent institution aﬀect the behavior
of making private contribution decisions.
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4. AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON SIMULTANEOUS CONTRIBUTION
AND THRESHOLD UNCERTAINTY
4.1 Motivation
In this paper, I seek to re-analyze individual contribution behaviors in a simul-
taneous subscription game with private information on valuations and threshold
uncertainty. Because it is diﬃcult to test individual contribution behavior using
empirical data, I conduct an experiment to investigate how individual contribution
behavior is aﬀected when the contributor is given diﬀerent cost uncertainties and test
the theoretical predictions in Gronberg and Peng (2014). The advantage of conduct-
ing a controlled laboratory experiment is that it helps us explore how individuals
make their contribution decisions in a speciﬁc environment (in this paper, I consider
private information on valuations and cost uncertainty). If subject’s behavior is in-
deed aﬀected by the factors I consider, it suggests that suppliers of public goods
should take into account private information on valuations and/or cost uncertainty
when they collect private contributions. If subject’s behavior is not aﬀected by these
factors, it helps us explore other possible factors that may aﬀect individual private
contribution behavior.
To test the theoretical comparative statics with respect to the threshold uncer-
tainty, I ﬁnd that decreasing the degree of threshold uncertainty in the sense of
mean-preserving contraction or increasing the mean of the threshold distribution
in the sense of the ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance, the individual, on average, is
more willing to contribute to the public good. As to the success rates of providing
the public good, the experimental results suggest that the empirical probability of
providing the public good is higher than the ex ante probabilities in all treatments.
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The empirical results also show that the success rates in the Baseline Treatment and
the Mean-Preserving Treatment are signiﬁcantly higher than that in the Variance-
Preserving Treatment.
According to the results of the random eﬀect Tobit regression, individual contri-
butions increase with the valuation of the public good. I also ﬁnd that individual
contributions decrease with the period of the experiment. The individual contributes
less to the public good in the latter periods. As to the individual characteristic vari-
ables, the estimation results show that females contribute higher amounts to the
public good. The results also indicate that individuals who are more risk-loving con-
tribute smaller amounts to the public good, although this result is not statistically
signiﬁcant.
The paper is structured as follows, Section 2 is the literature review. Section
3 summarizes the theoretical model that serves as the basis for the experimental
design. Section 4 introduces the experimental design and the procedures. Section 5
describes the hypotheses. Section 6 discusses the experimental results and Section 7
includes a conclusion.
4.2 Literature Review
Earlier studies investigate the contribution behavior in the complete informational
environment. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) and Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) both
assume that players make contribution decisions in the simultaneous contribution
institution with complete information on the public good valuation and a certain
known threshold level of cost. These two papers show that if the full refund rule
is introduced into the threshold public good game, the Nash equilibria are eﬃcient.
Issac, Schmidtz and Walker (1989) conduct an experiment to test the eﬃcacy of a
threshold public good mechanism where the valuation of the public good is common
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knowledge and the cost threshold is known. Their result shows that the full refund
rule dramatically improves the provision of the public good in the high and medium
provision cost environments.
In a real world environment, valuation of the public good is generally private
rather than public information. Some experimental literature considers the eﬀect
of private information on contribution. Marks and Croson (1999) conduct a dis-
crete public good experiment where subjects have incomplete information about the
valuations of others. They ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the rate of successful pro-
visions or level of group contributions when the subjects have limited information
about others’ valuations than when they have complete information.
Levati et al. (2009) move a step further and suppose that one does not know
his/her own marginal beneﬁt from the public good, but he/she is informed that it
can take one of two values with the same probability. They examine the eﬀect of
imperfect information on contributions by a two-person linear voluntary contribution
mechanism with stochastic marginal beneﬁts from a public good. They show that
limited information about the value of the public good signiﬁcantly lowers average
contributions.
Some studies instead focus on threshold uncertainty. Nitzan and Romano (1990)
extend Bagnoli and Lipman’s game by introducing uncertainty regarding the cost of
providing the public good and ﬁnd diﬀerent results. They ﬁnd that the equilibrium
is ineﬃcient because the uncertainty in cost may cause the ex post contributions to
exceed or fall short of the required threshold.
Wit and Wilke (1998) investigate the eﬀects of provision threshold uncertainty
on contribution to the discrete public good. They assume two diﬀerent threshold un-
certainty levels; under the low uncertainty case, the provision threshold is randomly
sampled from a uniform distribution over the range [800, 1000], while under the high
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uncertainty case, the provision threshold is randomly sampled from a uniform distri-
bution over the range [400, 1400]. The main ﬁnding in this paper is that threshold
uncertainty decreases the level of cooperation only under the high uncertainty case,
not under the low uncertainty case.
Gustafsson et al. (1999) conduct two experiments to compare the voluntary
contribution amount to public goods with the same expected provision threshold
but diﬀerent variances. They ﬁnd that subjects contribute more than the expected
provision threshold, but the average contribution is smaller in the high variance
group.
Analyzing a similar question, Suleiman et al. (2001) show that the eﬀect of
threshold uncertainty is moderated by the threshold mean: contribution to the pub-
lic good increases as a function of uncertainty for the lower threshold mean, and
decreases (though not signiﬁcantly) for the higher threshold mean.
McBride (2006) investigates how the level of threshold uncertainty aﬀects the
players’ contributions. In his model, McBride assumes that each player makes a
binary contribution decision simultaneously and the contribution will not be refunded
if the cost threshold is not met. He ﬁnds that instead of a monotonic relationship
between the degree of threshold uncertainty and total contributions, the eﬀect of
changing the threshold uncertainty on the contributions depends on the value of
the public good. An increase of the threshold uncertainty in the sense of mean-
preserving spread increases the player’s contribution when the value of the public
good is suﬃciently high, but decreases the player’s contribution when the value of
the public good is suﬃciently low. In a recent literature, McBride (2010) designs an
experiment to test his theory in a lab and ﬁnds limited veriﬁcation.
Barbieri and Malueg (2010) include both the threshold uncertainty and private
information on valuations for a public good in a subscription game. They focus on
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whether changing the intensity and dispersion of value distribution aﬀects players’
equilibrium contributions. They ﬁnd that increasing the value distribution in the
sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance, or dispersing the value distribution in the
sense of mean-preserving spread increases the equilibrium contributions.
Gronberg and Peng (2014) consider both the threshold uncertainty and private
information on public good’s valuation in a subscription game but focus on the eﬀect
of changing the threshold distribution. They ﬁnd that increasing the mean of the
cost in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance increases individual contribu-
tion, while increasing the uncertainty level of the cost in the sense of mean preserve
spread decreases individual contribution. Gronberg and Peng (2014) forms the the-
oretical basis for this paper. This experiment tests the theoretical predictions found
in Gronberg and Peng (2014).
4.3 Theoretical Model
The main objective of this paper is to test the theoretical predictions in Gronberg
and Peng (2014). To demonstrate the focus for this paper, I start by summarizing
their model. The theoretical model and theoretical equilibrium will serve as the basis
for the experimental design.
4.3.1 Basic Setup
Assume n ≥ 2 players simultaneously contribute any non-negative amounts to
the public good in a subscription game (Admati and Perry, 1991). Let xi ∈ [0, vi]
be player i’s contribution. Player’s valuation for the public good, vi, i = 1, ..., n, is
private information. That is, each player knows only his/her own realized valuation
for the public good. Each player believes that other players true valuations inde-
pendently follow a uniform distribution with support [0, 1]. Since each player’s value
follows the same distribution, this is a symmetric case.
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To provide the public good, the total contribution should equal or exceed the pro-
vision cost, c. Suppose c is unknown when the players contribute to the public good.
However, all players believe that the cost is independent of all vi’s and distributed
along a uniform distribution, G, with support [c¯−z, c¯+z], where c¯ is the mean of the
cost, z measures the degree of the cost uncertainty. In order to obtain the unique equi-
librium, the model should have the constraint that 0  (c¯− z) ≤ n−1
4
< n
2
 (c¯+ z).
Gronberg and Peng consider a subscription game. Thus, the players’ contri-
butions will be fully refunded if the total contributions are less than the realized
cost threshold. Also, they assume a zero rebate rule, which means that the excess
contributions will be given to the producer of the good.
The objective to each player is to maximize his/her expected payoﬀ. Based on
the assumptions above, player i’s expected payoﬀ function can be written as:
Ui(xi, vi) =
1
2z
(
vi − xi
)(
xi +
∑
j =i
E[xj(vj)]− (c¯− z)
)
(4.1)
Assume Kj ≡ E[xj(vj)] is player j’s expected contribution. In a symmetric equi-
librium, xj(vj) is independently and identically distributed. Thus, each player’s
expected contribution in this model should be identical and Kj can be replaced by
K. Therefore, the total expected contribution by (n− 1) other contributors can be
represented by (n− 1)K and player i’s expected payoﬀ function can be rewritten as:
Ui(xi, vi) =
1
2z
(
vi − xi
)(
xi + (n− 1)K − (c¯− z)
)
(4.2)
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4.3.2 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Decision Rule
Maximizing Equation (4.2) with respect to xi and taking the ﬁrst order condition
(F.O.C) yields player i’s best respond function:
xi
(
vi, (n− 1)K
)
= max
{
0,
1
2
[
vi − (n− 1)K + (c¯− z)
]}
, ∀ i (4.3)
Using the deﬁnition of expected contribution, Ki ≡ E[xi(vi)], and the best response
function, Equation (4.3), in symmetric equilibrium,
K = E
[
max
{
0,
1
2
[
vi − (n− 1)K + (c¯− z)
]}]
(4.4)
Assuming that players’ values are independently and uniformly distributed on [0, 1],
the expected contribution, in equilibrium, is
K∗ =
1 + c¯− z
n− 1 +
2
(n− 1)2
{
1−
[
1 + (n− 1)(1 + c¯− z)
] 1
2
}
(4.5)
This solution concept is a symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.
Player i’s equilibrium strategy, x∗i , must satisfy Equation (4.3) and K
∗, therefore,
x∗i can be written as
x∗i
(
vi, (n− 1)K∗
)
= max
{
0,
1
2
[
vi − (n− 1)K∗ + (c¯− z)
]}
(4.6)
where K∗ should be equal to Equation (4.5).
4.3.3 Comparative Statics
SinceK∗ is a function of c¯ and z, the cost distribution may aﬀect player’s expected
contribution. Gronberg and Peng (2014) consider the changes in the uniform cost
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distribution through mean-preserving spread and ﬁrst order stochastic dominance,
and try to analyze how these changes aﬀect player’s expected contribution.
First, I demonstrate the eﬀect of changing threshold uncertainty in the sense of
mean-preserving spread. From Equation (4.5), K∗ = 1+c¯−z
n−1 +
2
(n−1)2 − 2(n−1)2
[
1+(n−
1)(1 + c¯ − z)
] 1
2
in equilibrium. Diﬀerentiating Equation (4.5) with respect to the
variance of the cost distribution, z, it is shown that
dK∗
dz
=
1
n− 1
{
− 1 +
[
1 + (n− 1)(1 + c¯− z)
]−1
2
}
(4.7)
Since (c¯− z) is the lower bound of the threshold and assume (c¯− z) ≥ 0, dK∗
dz
<
0, this result shows that when the cost distribution becomes more dispersed, the
expected contributions will decrease.
Second, I demonstrate the eﬀect of increasing the mean of threshold distribution
in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance. From Equation (4.5), K∗ = 1+c¯−z
n−1 +
2
(n−1)2 − 2(n−1)2
[
1+ (n−1)(1+ c¯− z)
] 1
2
in equilibrium. Diﬀerentiating Equation (4.5)
with respect to the mean of the cost distribution, c¯, it is shown that
dK∗
dc¯
=
1
n− 1
{
1−
[
1 + (n− 1)(1 + c¯− z)
]−1
2
}
(4.8)
Since (c¯− z) is the lower bound of the threshold and assume (c¯ − z) ≥ 0, dK∗
dc¯
> 0,
this result shows that increasing the mean of the public good in the sense of ﬁrst
order stochastic dominance will increase the expected contribution.
4.4 Experimental Design and Procedures
4.4.1 Experimental Design
I am interested in examining the eﬀects of changing the cost distribution on in-
dividual contribution equilibrium. In order to test these eﬀects, I conduct a simple
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between-subject experiment, which compares the contribution behaviors with dif-
ferent cost distributions. Since this experiment is a between-subject design, each
subject participates in only one session and treatment.
There are 3 treatments in this experiment. The diﬀerences among the treatments
are the list of possible provision costs. One of them is called the Baseline Treatment.
In the Baseline Treatment, there are 14 possible provision costs: 10, 30, 50, 70,
90, 110, 130, 150, 170, 190, 210, 230, 250, or 270. The second Treatment is called
the Mean-Preserving Treatment. In the Mean-Preserving Treatment, I decrease the
dispersion degree of the cost distribution but keep the mean of cost distribution
the same as that in the Baseline Treatment. In the Mean-preserving Treatment,
8 possible provision costs are listed: 70, 90, 110, 130, 150, 170, 190, or 210. The
third treatment is called the Variance-Preserving Treatment. In this treatment, I
increase the mean of the cost distribution but keep the variance the same as that
in the Baseline Treatment. There are 14 possible provision costs in the Variance-
Preserving Treatment: 70, 90, 110, 130, 150, 170, 190, 210, 230, 250, 270, 290, 310,
or 330. Each treatment has 2 sessions.
I assume the value is private information for each subject. There are 6 possible
values and they are the same in each treatment. These possible values are 0, 20,
40, 60, 80, or 100. Each subject knows that his/her group members’ values are
independently and randomly drawn from these 6 values. His/her own value, which
is only known by himself/herself, is also one of these values.
The experiment is based on the following four-player game. Each subject is given
100 tokens in each period, and has to decide how to use his/her endowment. The
player has to decide how many tokens he/she wants to contribute to a project and
how many tokens to keep for himself/herself. Subjects make decisions simultaneously.
At the beginning of each period, each subject is given the following information:
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1. His/her own valuation of the project. If the project will be implemented, he/she
receives his/her own valuation of the project, taking one of the following values:
0, 20, 40, 60, 80, or 100. The value changes every period.
2. A list of possible valuations of the project his/her group members may have.
Each group member’s valuation of the project is independently and randomly
drawn from 6 possible values: 0, 20, 40, 60, 80, or 100.
3. A list of possible provision costs. There is the cost of providing the project. To
receive the valuation of the project, the total contribution of the group must
equal or exceed the provision cost. However, the provision cost is not disclosed
until each subject in the same group makes his/her decision. Each participant
is informed of the diﬀerent list of possible provision costs depending on the
treatment the subject is assigned to. At the end of each period, the provision
cost is independently and randomly drawn from the announced possible costs
by the computer.
Figure 4.1 shows an example of the computer interface in the Baseline Treatment
the subject may face when making his/her contribution decision.
After making the decision, subjects are informed about the realized provision
cost, total contribution of his/her group, whether the contribution is refunded or not
and the income he/she receives in the current period. Each subject’s income in each
period consists of three parts:
1. Income from tokens kept: the tokens which the subject has kept for him-
self/herself.
2. Income from the project: Whether the subject will get the payoﬀ from the
project depends on whether the total contribution is equal to or larger than
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Figure 4.1: Example of Decision Screen
the realized provision cost. Income from the project is determined as follows:
– If the provision cost is met: Income from the project = The subject’s
valuation of the project.
– If the provision cost is NOT met: Income from the project = 0.
3. Income from the refund rule: the amount the subject invests into the project
will be fully refunded to him/her if the total contribution in his/her group is
smaller than the realized provision cost. The income from the refund rule is
determined as follows:
– If the provision cost is NOT met & you contribute X tokens to the project:
Income from the refund rule = X.
– If the provision cost is met: Income from the refund rule = 0.
Thus, each subject’s income in each period can be represented by the following
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equation:
πi = 100− xi +Gi(
4∑
j=1
xj) +Ri (4.9)
where
Gi(
4∑
j=1
xj) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
vi if
∑4
j=1 xj ≥ c
0 if
∑4
j=1 xj < c
Ri =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
xi if
∑4
j=1 xj < c & xi > 0
0 o/w
Figure 4.2 is the example of payment screen in the Baseline Treatment.
Figure 4.2: Example of Payment Screen
4.4.2 Experimental Procedures
This experiment was conducted at the Economics Research Lab (ERL) at Texas
A&MUniversity. 72 subjects were recruited from the university-wide pool of students
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by the online system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Six sessions were conducted (two per
treatment) with 12 participants per session. Each session was conducted using z-tree
software (Fischbacher, 2007).
Upon arrival, each subject picked a chip to decide his/her seat with a privacy
partition. Subjects were then given the instructions (shown on the computer in
front of them). The experimenter read the instructions aloud. A short quiz was
given to gauge the subject’s understanding of the instructions and all subjects were
given the same quiz questions. Subjects had to answer all questions correctly for the
experiment to continue.
There were 12 participants in each session. The session consisted 30 periods of
the subscription game. Subjects were randomly re-matched with 3 other participants
in each session. Subjects were not informed of the identities of other participants
they were matched with, neither during nor after the experiment so that subjects’
decisions were not associated with ID numbers which could be used to establish
reputations. I randomly reassigned groups every period in an attempt to minimize
repeated game eﬀect and approximate the theoretical environment of a one-shot
game, making it much harder for a group eﬀect to develop.
At the end of the 30th period, each subject should drew two numbers randomly to
determine his/her own payment periods. Each subject got paid based on the income
he/she made in the two chosen periods. Since the subjects do not know which
period the payment will be based on, they should do their best in every period. This
payment method avoids the wealth eﬀect. At the end of the experiment, subjects
were asked to complete a short survey asking for basic demographic information and
were then privately paid according to their incomes in the two periods which had
been randomly selected at the end of the 30th period. The conversion rate for the
experiment is one token = 5 cents. Subjects earned approximately $15.83, including
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$5 show-up payment. Average session length was about one hour.
4.5 Hypotheses
As mentioned above, this experimental design represents a subscription game with
private information on valuation and threshold uncertainty. Thus, the equilibrium is
a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, also known as the expected contribution. Based on the
speciﬁc parameters chosen for the study, the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium prediction
in each treatment is shown in Table 4.1. In the Baseline Treatment, the Bayesian
Nash Equilibrium is 10.89. Mean-Preserving Treatment and Variance-Preserving
Treatment have the same Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, 19.88.
Table 4.1: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium Prediction
Baseline Mean-Preserving Variance-Preserving
Treatment Treatment Treatment
Bayesian
Nash 10.89 19.88 19.88
Equilibrium
From these Bayesian Nash Equilibria, I have the following three Hypotheses,
which are the comparative statics with respect to the threshold uncertainty.
Hypothesis 1a:
Keeping the mean of the cost distribution unchanged but decreasing the dis-
persion of the cost distribution will increase individual expected contribution
(Comparison between the Baseline Treatment and the Mean-Preserving Treat-
ment).
Hypothesis 1b:
Keeping the variance of the cost distribution unchanged but increasing the
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variance of the cost distribution will increase individual expected contribu-
tion (Comparison between the Baseline Treatment and the Variance-Preserving
Treatment).
Hypothesis 1c:
With the same lower bound of the cost distribution, the expected contribu-
tions in the Mean-Preserving Treatment and the Variance-Preserving Treat-
ment should be the same.
In this paper I also focus on the success rate (that is, the probability of pro-
viding the public good successfully). According to the experimental parameters
in this paper, I calculate the ex ante probability of providing the public good in
each treatment, shown in Table 4.2. From Table 4.2, the success rate in the Base-
line, Mean-Preserving and Variance-Preserving Treatment are 18.13%, 19.86% and
11.35%, respectively. Comparing the success rates in diﬀerent treatments, I propose
the following hypotheses:
Table 4.2: Ex Ante Probability
Baseline Mean-Preserving Variance-Preserving
Treatment Treatment Treatment
Ex Ante
Probability 18.13% 19.86% 11.35%
Hypothesis 2a:
The ex ante probability in the Baseline Treatment is lower than the ex ante
probability in the Mean-Preserving Treatment.
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Hypothesis 2b: The ex ante probability in the Baseline Treatment is higher
than the ex ante probability in the Variance-Preserving Treatment.
Hypothesis 2c:
The ex ante probability in the Mean-Preserving Treatment is higher than the
ex ante probability in the Variance-Preserving Treatment.
4.6 Results
4.6.1 Average Contribution
Figure 4.3 tracks the average contribution to the public good over the 30 periods
in each treatment. From this ﬁgure, I ﬁnd that although the average contribution in
each treatment ﬂuctuates over the 30 period, the average contribution in the Baseline
Treatment is the lowest and the average contribution in the Variance-Preserving
Treatment is the highest in the most periods.
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Figure 4.3: Average Contribution over the 30 Periods
Table 4.3 presents the empirical average contribution in three treatments. The av-
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erage contributions in the Baseline, Mean-Preserving and Variance-Preserving Treat-
ments are 26.43, 30.80, and 33.77, respectively. Comparing the average contribution
with the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium prediction, shown in Table 4.1, I ﬁnd that the
average contribution is signiﬁcantly higher than the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium pre-
diction in every treatment (p = 0.00 in each treatment, t-test).
Table 4.3: Average Contribution in Three Treatments
Baseline Mean-Preserving Variance-Preserving
Treatment Treatment Treatment
Average Contribution 26.43 30.80 33.77
(standard error) (1.00) (0.94) (1.10)
Result 1: The average contribution in all treatments are signiﬁcantly larger
than the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, which derives from maximizing individual
expected payoﬀ.
Next, I compare the average contribution in diﬀerent treatments: Baseline Treat-
ment vs. Mean-Preserving Treatment, Baseline Treatment vs. Variance-Preserving
Treatment, and Mean-Preserving Treatment vs. Variance-Preserving Treatment.
Comparing the average contribution between the Baseline Treatment and the Mean-
Preserving Treatment, I ﬁnd that the average contribution in the former treatment is
signiﬁcantly smaller than the average contribution in the latter treatment (p = 0.00,
t-test). Thus, the experimental result supports Hypothesis 1a: Decreasing the degree
of threshold uncertainty in the sense of mean-preserving contraction causes individ-
uals, on average, to be more willing to contribute to the public good.
Comparing the average contribution between the Baseline Treatment and the
Variance-Preserving Treatment, I show that the average contribution in the Baseline
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Treatment is signiﬁcantly smaller than the average contribution in the Variance-
Preserving Treatment (p = 0.00, t-test). Thus, the experimental result also supports
Hypothesis 1b: Increasing the mean of the cost distribution in the sense of the ﬁrst
order stochastic dominance causes individuals, on average, to be more willing to
contribute to the public good.
Comparing the Mean-Preserving and the Variance-Preserving Treatment, I ﬁnd
that the average contribution in the Mean-Preserving Treatment is signiﬁcantly
smaller than the average contribution in the Variance-Preserving Treatment (p =
0.01, t-test). This experimental result rejects Hypothesis 1c that the average contri-
bution in these two treatments should be the same.
Result 2: I ﬁnd empirical supports for Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 1b. I
ﬁnd that decreasing the degree of threshold uncertainty in the sense of the
mean-preserving contraction increases average individual contribution. I also
ﬁnd that increasing the mean of the threshold distribution in the sense of ﬁrst-
order stochastic dominance increases average individual contribution.
The empirical results above show that although some hypotheses are signiﬁcantly
supported, the level of the average contribution is signiﬁcantly higher than the the-
oretical prediction in each treatment. I try to analyze which value of the public
good an individual has will result in contributing higher amounts to the public good.
Figure 4.4 depicts the distribution of value and contribution by treatment. The top
ﬁgure illustrates the Baseline Treatment, followed by the Mean-Preserving Treatment
and the Variance-Preserving Treatment.
The red triangle in the ﬁgure represents the equilibrium strategy prediction for
each value. For example, in the Baseline Treatment, the equilibrium strategy predic-
tion of an individual with value 0 is 0 tokens and the equilibrium strategy prediction
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Figure 4.4: Value and Contribution in Three Treatments
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of an individual with value 60 is 10.6 tokens. The circle represents the individual
contribution observations in the experiment. The larger the circle is, the higher the
frequency this contribution level made by the individual is observed. For example,
when value is 0, the contribution amount, 0, has the highest frequency. The green
diamond in the ﬁgure represents the average contribution level for each value. For
example, in the Baseline Treatment, the average contribution level of an individual
with value = 0 is 9.62 tokens and the average contribution level under value = 60 is
30.30 tokens.
Table 4.4 illustrates the equilibrium strategy prediction, average contribution
level and the test result for each value in each treatment.
Table 4.4: Equilibrium Strategy and Average Contribution for Each Value
Baseline Mean-Preserving Variance-Preserving
Treatment Treatment Treatment
Equilibrium 0.0 0.0 0.0
v = 0 Average Contribution 9.6∗∗∗ 16.2∗∗∗ 17.8∗∗∗
(standard error) (1.9) (2.0) (2.5)
Equilibrium 1.8 2.5 2.5
v = 20 Average Contribution 16.7∗∗∗ 20.0∗∗∗ 22.0∗∗∗
(standard error) (2.1) (1.9) (2.3)
Equilibrium 5.6 11.7 11.7
v = 40 Average Contribution 20.3∗∗∗ 30.8∗∗∗ 30.9∗∗∗
(standard error) (1.4) (1.9) (2.3)
Equilibrium 10.6 23.6 23.6
v = 60 Average Contribution 30.3∗∗∗ 34.6∗∗∗ 37.7∗∗∗
(standard error) (1.6) (1.7) (2.1)
Equilibrium 18.9 35.9 35.9
v = 80 Average Contribution 37.6∗∗∗ 39.6∗∗ 44.3∗∗∗
(standard error) (1.8) (2.1) (2.5)
Equilibrium 28.4 45.6 45.6
v = 100 Average Contribution 44.4∗∗∗ 43.8 50.2∗∗
(standard error) (2.5) (2.5) (2.6)
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Focusing on the Baseline Treatment ﬁrst, I ﬁnd that no matter what value the
individual places on the public good (based on his/her assignment), his/her contri-
bution, on average, is signiﬁcantly higher than the equilibrium strategy. (p = 0.00,
t-test). This result notes that the average contribution is higher than Nash Bayesian
Equilibrium because the individual contributes a higher amount than the equilibrium
strategy. Mean-Preserving Treatment has similar results to the Baseline Treatment
when the value of public good is 0, 20, 40, 60 or 80. That is, individual contri-
bution, on average, is signiﬁcantly higher than the theoretical equilibrium strategy
when the value of the public good is 0, 20, 40, 60 (p = 0.00, t-test) or 80 (p = 0.04,
t-test). Therefore, the higher average contribution occurs because individuals with
value 0, 20, 40, 60 or 80 contribute a higher amount to the public good in the
Mean-Preserving Treatment. The individual with value 100 in the Mean-Preserving
Treatment contributes lower amounts than the theoretical equilibrium strategy, but
it is not statistically signiﬁcant(p = 0.24, t-test). As to the Variance-Preserving
Treatment, I ﬁnd that individuals with value 0, 20, 40, 60, 80 (p = 0.00, t-test) or
100 (p = 0.04, t-test) also contribute higher amounts than the theoretical prediction.
Result 3: The average contribution is higher than the Bayesian-Nash Equi-
librium prediction from individuals assigned a valuation of the public good of
0, 20, 40, 60 and 80 for all treatments and with a valuation of 100 in the Base-
line Treatment and the Variance-Preserving Treatment. These individuals are
willing to contribute higher amounts to the public good than that predicted by
the equilibrium model.
Three reasons could explain why the average contribution is higher than that
predicted by the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium model. First, individuals do not follow
the objective of maximizing expected payoﬀ. When an individual makes his/her
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contribution decision, he/she may take into account factors such as risk attitude,
altruism, or cooperation above expected payoﬀ maximization. The second reason
is that private information on valuation and threshold uncertainty make decision
making more complicated. Thus, individuals might have trouble arriving at the
equilibrium strategy. Another reason could be that participants in the experiment do
not understand fully the rules of this game. Figure 4.4 shows that many observations
are above the diagonal, meaning that the contribution is higher than the valuation.
In this subscription game, the subject may be worse oﬀ when his/her contribution
is higher than his/her value and the public project is implemented. For example,
a subject with value 40 contributes 50 tokens to the public project and the public
project is provided, his/her payoﬀ is 90 tokens. This amount is lower than his/her
initial endowment, 100 tokens. Thus, if the participant realizes that he/she may be
worse oﬀ when his/her contribution is larger than this value, he/she should avoid
this situation happened.
I draw the frequency of contribution that is higher than the value in each treat-
ment and ascertain whether the participants contribute more than his/her own value
occurs because the participant is not familiar with the subscription game. From Fig-
ure 4.5, I observe that regardless of the treatment the subjects participate in, the
frequency of contribution that is higher than the value is highest in Period 1. Al-
though the frequency does not decrease dramatically, I ﬁnd that the frequency in the
last 10 periods is relatively low. Therefore, I will use the observations in the last 10
periods to analyze the results of comparative statics again.
Table 4.5 illustrates the empirical average contribution in the last 10 periods
in each treatment. The average contribution in the Baseline Treatment is 23.99.
Although it is lower than the average contribution in all 30 periods, 26.43, it is
still signiﬁcantly higher than the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, 10.89 (p = 0.00, t-
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test). As to the Mean-Preserving Treatment, the average contribution of the last 10
periods , 29.31, is very close to the average contribution of all periods, 30.80, and it
is signiﬁcantly higher than the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, 19.88 (p = 0.00, t-test).
The average contribution in the Variance-Preserving Treatment is 30.82, which is
lower than the average contribution of 30 periods, 33.77, is signiﬁcantly higher than
the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, 19.88 (p = 0.00, t-test).
Table 4.5: Average Contribution of Period 21∼30 in Three Treatments
Baseline Mean-Preserving Variance-Preserving
Treatment Treatment Treatment
Average Contribution 23.99 29.31 30.82
(standard error) (1.44) (1.65) (1.92)
Result 4: Using the experimental data in Period 21∼30, the average con-
tribution in all treatments is still signiﬁcantly larger than the Bayesian-Nash
equilibria, which derive from maximizing individual expected payoﬀ.
I also test the comparative statics with respect to the uncertainty using the last 10
period data. To compare the average contribution between the Baseline Treatment
and the Mean-Preserving Treatment, I ﬁnd that the average contribution in the
Baseline Treatment is signiﬁcantly smaller than the average contribution in the Mean-
Preserving Treatment (p = 0.00, t-test). Thus, the experimental data in the last 10
periods also supports Hypothesis 1a: Decreasing the degree of threshold uncertainty
in the sense of mean-preserving contraction causes individuals, on average, to be
more willing to contribute to the public good.
Comparing the average contribution between the Baseline Treatment and the
Variance-Preserving Treatment, I show that the average contribution in the Baseline
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Treatment is signiﬁcantly smaller than the average contribution in the Variance-
Preserving Treatment (p = 0.00, t-test). The experimental data in the last 10
periods, again, supports Hypothesis 1b: Increasing the mean of the cost distribution
in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance causes individuals, on average, to be
more willing to contribute to the public good.
Comparing the Mean-Preserving and the Variance-Preserving Treatment, I can-
not reject the null hypothesis that the average contribution in the Mean-Preserving
Treatment is equal to the average contribution in the Variance-Preserving Treatment
using only the last 10 periods of experimental data (p = 0.51, t-test). This exper-
imental result is consistent with Hypothesis 1c: With the same lower bound of the
cost distribution, the average contribution in the Mean-Preserving Treatment and
the Variance-Preserving Treatment should be the same.
To summarize the results of comparative statics with respect to the threshold, I
ﬁnd that whether I use all periods data or the last 10 periods data, the empirical
results are consistent with Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 1b: Decreasing the degree of
threshold uncertainty in the sense of mean-preserving contraction causes individuals,
on average, to be more willing to contribute to the public good. Increasing the mean
of the cost distribution in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance also causes
individuals, on average, to be more willing to contribute to the public good. However,
the empirical results partly support Hypothesis 1c: the average contribution in the
Mean-Preserving Treatment and the Variance-Preserving Treatment should be the
same. Another important experimental result is that although the empirical data
supports hypotheses of comparative statics, the level of average contribution to the
public project is far higher than the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
Although the frequency with which the contribution is higher than the value is
relative small in the last 10 periods, the average contribution in the last 10 periods
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is still signiﬁcantly higher than the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. In the following
paragraphs, I will discuss how an individual with diﬀerent values contributes to the
public good project using the last 10 periods of observations. Figure 4.6 illustrates
the relation between the value and the contribution using the last 10 periods of
data. The red triangles represent the equilibrium strategy prediction, which derives
from maximizing the expected payoﬀ. The green diamonds represent the average
contribution of the last 10 periods under each value. The circles are the contribution
observations.
Figure 4.6 shows that the average contribution increases with the value assigned
to participants. That is, the higher the value is, the higher the average contribution
is. Thus, the relationship between the value and the contribution is consistent with
the theoretical prediction. However, the levels of average contribution diﬀer from
the equilibrium strategies.
Table 4.6 shows the average contribution of Period 21∼30 and the equilibrium
strategy under each value in three treatments. In the Baseline Treatment, the average
contribution is signiﬁcantly higher than the equilibrium strategy under all values
(p = 0.00, t-test). This result shows that the average contribution in the Baseline
Treatment is higher than the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium projection, consistent with
the result using all periods of data.
In the Mean-Preserving Treatment, the individual, on average, contributes sig-
niﬁcantly higher amounts to the public good when his/her value is 0, 20, 40, or 60
(p = 0.00, t-test). As to the Variance-Preserving Treatment, the individual, on av-
erage, contributes signiﬁcantly higher amounts to the public good under all values
except 80 (p = 0.00 when value is 0, 20, 40, or 60 and p = 0.07 when value is 100,
t-test). The results in these two treatment are similar to the results using all periods
of data.
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Table 4.6: Equilibrium Strategy and Average Contribution for Each Value in Period
21∼30
Baseline Mean-Preserving Variance-Preserving
Treatment Treatment Treatment
Equilibrium 0.0 0.0 0.0
v = 0 Average Contribution 8.5∗∗∗ 10.0∗∗∗ 9.2∗∗∗
(standard error) (3.15) (3.0) (3.6)
Equilibrium 1.8 2.5 2.5
v = 20 Average Contribution 10.1∗∗∗ 17.8∗∗∗ 19.4∗∗∗
(standard error) (2.6) (3.4) (4.0)
Equilibrium 5.6 11.7 11.7
v = 40 Average Contribution 14.8∗∗∗ 32.8∗∗∗ 25.4∗∗∗
(standard error) (2.1) (3.2) (4.0)
Equilibrium 10.6 23.6 23.6
v = 60 Average Contribution 28.5∗∗∗ 32.3∗∗∗ 33.2∗∗∗
(standard error) (3.7) (2.3) (3.4)
Equilibrium 18.9 35.9 35.9
v = 80 Average Contribution 36.4∗∗∗ 36.9 39.5
(standard error) (2.4) (2.8) (3.7)
Equilibrium 28.4 45.6 45.6
v = 100 Average Contribution 39.0∗∗∗ 43.7 51.7∗
(standard error) (4.3) (4.3) (4.1)
According to the data of Period 21∼30, I ﬁnd that although the frequency of the
observations that the contribution is higher than the value is relative low among the
whole periods, the individual still contributes higher amounts than the equilibrium
strategy under most values. This results suggest that many other factors exist that
aﬀect individual contribution decisions in a subscription game.
4.6.2 Success Rate
This paper shows that the average contribution in all treatments is higher than
the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. Now, I analyze whether the success rates of proving
the public good are consistent with the theoretical ex ante probabilities using the
Binomial probability test. I calculate the success rates using all the data and with
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only the last 10 periods of data, calling these two success rates Pall and P21−30,
respectively. When I use all-period data to calculate the success rate, Pall, there are
180 group observations in each treatment — 3 groups per period × 30 periods per
session × 2 sessions per treatment. When I use the last 10 periods data to calculate
the success rate, P21−30, there are 60 group observations — 3 groups per period × 10
periods per session × 2 sessions per treatment. Table 4.7 reports the two observed
success rates for each treatment.
Table 4.7: Observed Success Rate
Baseline Mean-Preserving Variance-Preserving
Treatment Treatment Treatment
Pall 37.22% 39.44% 27.78%
(standard error) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
P21−30 35.00% 38.33% 21.67%
(standard error) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
I ﬁrst discuss the results related to Pall in each treatment. Among 180 group ob-
servations in the Baseline Treatment, 67 observations successfully provide the public
good. The Pall in the Baseline Treatment is 37.22%, and it is statistically signiﬁcant
higher than the theoretical predicted probability, 18.13% (p = 0.00). The Mean-
Preserving Treatment has the similar result. 71 group observations succeed in pro-
viding the public good. The Pall in the Mean-Preserving Treatment, 39.44%, is also
statistically signiﬁcant higher than the theoretical prediction, 19.86%, (p = 0.00). In
the Variance-Preserving Treatment, 50 of 180 group observations successfully pro-
vide the public good. The Pall in the Variance-Preserving Treatment, 27.78%, is
statistically signiﬁcant higher than the theoretical prediction, 11.35% (p = 0.00).
To calculate P21−30, I use 60 group observations in each treatment. Among these
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60 group observations in the Baseline Treatment, 21 observations successfully pro-
vide the public good. Thus, P21−30 in the Baseline Treatment is 35%. This is sig-
niﬁcantly higher than the theoretical prediction (p = 0.00). In the Mean-Preserving
Treatment, 23 observations provide the public good successfully, thus, P21−30 in the
Mean-Preserving Treatment is 38.33%. It is also signiﬁcantly higher than the theo-
retical prediction (p = 0.00). As to the Variance-Preserving Treatment, 13 observa-
tions successfully provide the public good, and the P21−30 in the Variance-Preserving
Treatment is 21.67%. This is still signiﬁcantly higher than the theoretical prediction
(p = 0.00).
In order to test Hypothesis 2a -2c, I conduct the two-sample test of proportion. I
ﬁrst compare the success rates in any two treatments using all periods of data. That
is, I compare Pall across diﬀerent treatments. To test the Pall in the Baseline Treat-
ment and the Mean-Preserving Treatment, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that
the Pall in these two treatments are equal (two-tailed p-value p = 0.66, two-sample
test of proportion). However, the Pall in the Baseline Treatment is signiﬁcantly higher
than the Pall in the Variance-Preserving Treatment (one-tailed p-value p = 0.03, two-
sample test of proportion). Comparing the Pall in the Mean-Preserving Treatment
and the Variance-Preserving Treatment, I ﬁnd that the Pall in the Mean-Preserving
Treatment is signiﬁcantly higher than the Pall in the Variance-Preserving Treatment
(one-tailed p-value p = 0.01, two-sample test of proportion).
I also compare the success rate across diﬀerent treatments by the last 10 periods
data, which is called P21−30. I get a similar results that the Baseline Treatment and
the Mean-Preserving Treatment both have signiﬁcantly higher success rates than the
Variance-Preserving Treatment (one-tailed p-value p = 0.05 and 0.02, respectively,
two-sample test of proportion). As for comparing the Baseline Treatment with the
Mean-Preserving Treatment, I ﬁnd that the public good is less often provided in the
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Baseline Treatment compared to in the Mean-Preserving Treatment, but it is not
statistically signiﬁcant (one-tailed p-value p = 0.33, two-sample test of proportion).
Using a two-sample test of proportion, the empirical data supports Hypothesis
2b and 2c that the success rates in the Baseline Treatment and the Mean-Preserving
Treatment is signiﬁcantly higher than in the Variance-Preserving Treatment. This
holds true for the last 10 periods and the all periods together. However, compar-
ing the Baseline Treatment with the Mean-Preserving Treatment, I do not ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant diﬀerence for the last 10 periods and all periods together.
Result 5: The empirical probabilities of providing the public good are higher
than the ex ante probabilities all treatment. But the empirical data only sup-
ports Hypothesis 2b and Hypothesis 2c that the success rates in the Baseline
Treatment and the Mean-Preserving Treatment are higher than that in the
Variance-Preserving Treatment.
4.6.3 Average Payoﬀ
Suppliers of the public good care about the amount of total contribution they can
receive from contributors. Contributors care about the payoﬀ they may receive after
making a contribution to a public good. In this subsection, I compare the individual
payoﬀ in the three treatments.
Table 4.8 shows the expected payoﬀ and the average payoﬀ in each treatment.
Average Payoﬀall is measured using all periods of data and Average Payoﬀ21−30 is
measured using the last 10 periods of data.
Although the average payoﬀ in each treatment is close to the expected payoﬀ,
this does not happen as a result of individuals making contribution decisions based
on maximizing their expected payoﬀ. Figure 4.7 shows the average payoﬀ under each
value in the three treatments.
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Table 4.8: Expected Payoﬀ and Average Payoﬀ in Three Treatments
Baseline Mean-Preserving Variance-Preserving
Treatment Treatment Treatment
Expected Payoﬀ 108.24 108.05 104.60
Average Payoﬀall 108.73 106.91 102.90
(standard error) (0.89) (0.86) (0.73)
Average Payoﬀ21−30 109.06 109.35 103.76
(standard error) (1.26) (1.52) (1.16)
I ﬁnd that individuals with speciﬁc values are worse oﬀ when contributing to the
public good. For example, I show that an individual with value = 0, on average,
contributes 9 tokens to the public good. Since the participant’s contribution is higher
than his/her value, he/she will suﬀer from loss when the public good is provided.
From Figure 4.7, I observe that the average payoﬀs of the subject with value 0,
20, 40, and 60 are lower than the theoretical prediction derived from maximizing
the expected payoﬀ. This result demonstrates that although these subjects make
contributions higher than the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, they can increase the
probability of providing the public good. However, the increased payoﬀ from the
higher provision probability is not large enough to cover the decreased payoﬀ from
contributing higher than the optimal amount to maximize expected payoﬀ.
The subject with values 80 and 100 receives higher average payoﬀ than the the-
oretical prediction. For these subjects, the increased payoﬀ from higher provision
probability is larger than the decreased payoﬀ from higher contribution, therefore,
they can enjoy higher average payoﬀ even if their average contributions are higher
than the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
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Figure 4.7: Expected Payoﬀ and Average Payoﬀ in Three Treatments
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4.6.4 Individual Results
In this subsection, I report a random eﬀect Tobit regression using individual
contribution data. The dependent variable is each subject’s contribution, which is
naturally censored to lie between 0 and 100. The independent variables included in
the model are described below:
• Value: measures the value of the public good
• Mean-Preserving: treatment dummy variable. It equals 1 if the treatment
is Mean-Preserving Treatment; 0 otherwise.
• Variance-Preserving: treatment dummy variable. It equals 1 if the treat-
ment is Variance-Preserving Treatment; 0 otherwise.
• Period: dummy variables that capture time ﬁxed eﬀect.
• Female: equals 1 if the subject is female; 0 otherwise
• Risk: measures subject’s risk preference. I use Eckel and Grossman’s (2008)
model to measure risk preference. Each subject choose one of 5 choices he
prefers:
1. 50% chance of receiving $10 and 50% chance of receiving $10.
2. 50% chance of receiving $18 and 50% chance of receiving $6.
3. 50% chance of receiving $26 and 50% chance of receiving $2.
4. 50% chance of receiving $34 and 50% chance of receiving -$2.
5. 50% chance of receiving $42 and 50% chance of receiving -$6.
The higher number of choice means the subject is more risk-loving.
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• Successt−1: equals 1 if the public good was successfully provided in the pre-
vious period; 0, otherwise.
• Total Contributiont−1: total contribution in the previous period.
• Mean-Preserving ∗ Value: interactions of Value with treatment variables
Mean-Preserving.
• Variance-Preserving ∗ Value: interactions of Value with treatment vari-
ables Variance-Preserving.
• Mean-Preserving ∗ Successt−1: interactions of Successt−1 with treatment
variables Mean-Preserving.
• Variance-Preserving ∗ Successt−1: interactions of Successt−1 with treat-
ment variables Variance-Preserving.
• Mean-Preserving ∗ Total Contributiont−1: interactions of treatment vari-
ables Mean-Preserving with Total Contributiont−1 .
• Variance-Preserving ∗ Total Contributiont−1: interactions of treatment
variables Variance-Preserving with Total Contributiont−1.
Table 4.9 reports the results of all observations (72 subjects, 30 periods) and
Table 4.10 reports the results of the last 10-period observations (72 subjects, 10
periods).
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Table 4.9: Estimation of Random Eﬀect Tobit Regression — All Observations
Random eﬀect Tobit regression (A-1) (A-2) (A-3) (A-4)
Dependent variable: contribution Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
Value 0.427∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Mean-Preserving 8.481 8.425 8.375 15.387∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.01)
Variance-Preserving 10.001∗ 9.567∗ 9.800∗ 12.94∗∗
(0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.02)
Period −0.488∗∗∗ −0.487∗∗∗ −0.462∗∗∗ −0.489∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female 8.303∗ 8.432∗ 8.482∗ 8.349∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Risk −0.051∗ −2.717 −2.716 −2.796∗
(0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10)
Successt−1 −3.755∗∗∗
(0.00)
Total Contributiont−1 0.005
(0.61)
Mean-Preserving ∗ Value −0.131∗∗∗
(0.00)
Variance-Preserving ∗ Value −0.054
(0.16)
Constant 10.487 11.260 8.810 7.150
(0.13) (0.11) (0.22) (0.31)
Log likelihood −7933.70 −7638.67 −7644.27 −7927.66
Left-censored 469 456 456 469
Uncensored 1636 1578 1578 1636
Right-censored 55 54 54 55
∗∗∗ denotes 1% signiﬁcance; ∗∗ denotes 5% signiﬁcance; ∗ denotes 10% signiﬁcance.
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Table 4.9 continued.
Random eﬀect Tobit regression (A-5) (A-6)
Dependent variable: contribution Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
(p-value) (p-value)
Value 0.497∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Mean-Preserving 17.789∗∗∗ 22.596∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Variance-Preserving 13.618∗∗ 11.920∗
(0.06) (0.07)
Period −0.495∗∗∗ −0.461∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Female 8.454∗ 8.293∗
(0.07) (0.08)
Risk −2.774 −2.788
(0.11) (0.11)
Successt−1 −0.728
(0.70)
Total Contributiont−1 0.019
(0.30)
Mean-Preserving ∗ Value −0.134∗∗∗ −0.135∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Variance-Preserving ∗ Value −0.049 −0.057
(0.21) (0.15)
Mean-Preserving ∗ Successt−1 −5.619∗∗
(0.03)
Variance-Preserving ∗ Successt−1 −3.664
(0.18)
Mean-Preserving ∗ Total Contributiont−1 −0.059∗∗
(0.03)
Variance-Preserving ∗ Total Contributiont−1 0.004
(0.87)
Constant 6.930 4.067
(0.34) (0.59)
Log likelihood −7630.21 −7634.47
Left-censored 456 456
Uncensored 1578 1578
Right-censored 54 54
∗∗∗ denotes 1% signiﬁcance; ∗∗ denotes 5% signiﬁcance; ∗ denotes 10% signiﬁcance.
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Table 4.10: Estimation of Random Eﬀect Tobit Regression — Last 10-Period Obser-
vations
Random eﬀect Tobit regression (L-1) (L-2) (L-3) (L-4)
Dependent variable: contribution Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
Value 0.479∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Mean-Preserving 9.570∗∗ 9.591∗∗ 9.277∗ 11.298∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09)
Variance-Preserving 9.543∗ 9.596∗ 9.097 5.499
(0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.42)
Period −0.575∗∗ −0.577∗∗ −0.556∗∗ −0.575∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Female 11.482∗∗ 11.490∗∗ 11.354∗∗ 11.428∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Risk −2.460 −2.458 −2.428 −2.440
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18)
Successt−1 0.324
(0.86)
Total Contributiont−1 0.016
(0.34)
Mean-Preserving ∗ Value −0.032
(0.62)
Variance-Preserving ∗ Value 0.070
(0.28)
Constant −3.548 −3.662 −5.175 −2.882
(0.64) (0.63) (0.51) (0.72)
Log likelihood −2527.68 −2527.67 −2527.23 −2526.33
Left-censored 184 184 184 184
Uncensored 524 524 524 524
Right-censored 12 12 12 12
∗∗∗ denotes 1% signiﬁcance; ∗∗ denotes 5% signiﬁcance; ∗ denotes 10% signiﬁcance.
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Table 4.10 continued.
Random eﬀect Tobit regression (L-5) (L-6)
Dependent variable: contribution Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
(p-value) (p-value)
Value 0.466∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Mean-Preserving 13.153∗ 16.625∗∗
(0.06) (0.04)
Variance-Preserving 6.758 5.584
(0.33) (0.48)
Period −0.575∗∗ −0.561∗∗
(0.04) (0.05)
Female 11.264∗∗ 11.063∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Risk −2.448 −2.406
(0.18) (0.18)
Successt−1 3.040
(0.31)
Total Contributiont−1 0.031
(0.30)
Mean-Preserving ∗ Value −0.033 −0.034
(0.60) (0.59)
Variance-Preserving ∗ Value 0.073 0.065
(0.26) (0.32)
Mean-Preserving ∗ Successt−1 −5.099
(0.24)
Variance-Preserving ∗ Successt−1 −4.444
(0.35)
Mean-Preserving ∗ Total Contributiont−1 −0.051
(0.23)
Variance-Preserving ∗ Total Contributiont−1 −0.006
(0.89)
Constant −3.852 −5.907
(0.63) (0.49)
Log likelihood −2525.53 −2525.10
Left-censored 184 184
Uncensored 524 524
Right-censored 12 12
∗∗∗ denotes 1% signiﬁcance; ∗∗ denotes 5% signiﬁcance; ∗ denotes 10% signiﬁcance.
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I ﬁrst concentrate on the variable Value. Whether I use all observations or the
last 10-period observation, I show that Value has signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on
the contribution. This means that the higher the individual values the public good,
the higher contribution that participant makes. This result supports the theoretical
contribution strategy that the contribution is increasing in the value of the public
good. When I include the interactions of Value with treatment variables Mean-
Preserving and Variance-Preserving (Model (A-4) to Model (A-6) in Table 4.9
and Model (L-4) to Model (L-6) in Table 4.10), I ﬁnd that while increasing the value
of the public goods increases the contribution, the increase is signiﬁcantly smaller in
the Mean-Preserving Treatment by all observations.
Second, I focus on the treatment dummy variables, Mean-Preserving and
Variance-Preserving, and analyze the diﬀerences in contributions depending on
the treatment the individual participates in. Table 4.9 and 4.10 show that Mean-
Preserving is signiﬁcantly positive. Thus, an individual who participates in the
Mean-Preserving Treatment contributes signiﬁcantly higher amounts to the public
good than in the Baseline Treatment. This result provides additional support for
Hypothesis 1a. The other treatment variable, Variance-Preserving, is marginally
signiﬁcantly positive with all observations and in models (L-1) and (L-2) with the
last 10-period observations. Although I get limited veriﬁcation that the individual
who takes part in the Variance-Preserving Treatment contributes signiﬁcantly higher
amounts to the public good than in the Baseline Treatment, the result provides sup-
plementary support for Hypothesis 1b.
The variable Period is signiﬁcantly negative. This indicates that an individual
contributes signiﬁcantly smaller amounts to the public good project in latter periods
of the experiment. This result is consistent with the assertion that the frequency
with which the contribution is higher than the valuation becomes lower and the
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contribution amount decreases in latter periods.
I also include the time invariant variables: gender, Female, and risk preference,
Risk. I ﬁnd that females contribute higher amounts to the public good project
than males. The risk preference variable shows that the individual who is more risk-
loving contributes smaller amounts to the public project. However, this result is not
statistically signiﬁcant.
When considering whether the public good was provided in the previous period,
Successt−1, I ﬁnd that if the public good was provided in the previous period, the
individual will decrease his/her contribution (Model (A-3)). However, considering
the interaction terms, Mean-Preserving ∗ Successt−1 and Variance-Preserving
∗ Successt−1, together, whether the public good was provided in the previous period
or not does not aﬀect individual contributions. But, the individuals contribute less
in the Mean-Preserving Treatment when the public good was successfully provided
(Model (A-5)).
When I include the previous total contribution and the interaction terms with
value as an independent variable, Total Contributiont−1, Mean-Preserving ∗
Total Contributiont−1 and Variance-Preserving ∗ Total Contributiont−1, I
ﬁnd that these variables do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the contribution. However, indi-
viduals contribute less in the Mean-Preserving Treatment when the total contribution
in the group is higher in the previous period.
4.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I conduct an experiment to analyze individual voluntary contribu-
tion behavior in an environment with private information on valuation and threshold
uncertainty. I also test the comparative statics with respect to the threshold uncer-
tainty.
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From the experimental data, I show that whatever threshold uncertainty the
individuals face, the average contribution is signiﬁcantly higher than the Bayesian
Nash equilibrium, which is derived from maximizing individual expected payoﬀ. This
result implies that making contribution decisions consistent with the Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium condition of maximizing individual expected payoﬀ seems diﬃcult in
an environment with private information on valuation and threshold uncertainty.
This result also leads me to believe that other important factors aﬀect individual
voluntary contribution behavior.
Although the level of the average contribution is higher than the Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium, the experimental data supports the theoretical predictions of the com-
parative statics in Gronberg and Peng (2014). I ﬁnd that decreasing the degree of
threshold uncertainty in the sense of mean-preserving contraction makes individuals,
on average, more willing to contribute to a public good. Also, I ﬁnd that increasing
the mean of the threshold distribution in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance
makes individuals, on average, more willing to contribute to a public good.
The success rate of providing the public good represents a strong performance
measure for the supplier of a public good. Keeping the variance unchanged, I ﬁnd
that the success rate in the case of smaller mean of cost distribution is signiﬁcantly
higher than that in the case of larger mean of cost distribution. However, keeping the
mean unchanged, the success rate in the case of small dispersion of cost distribution
and in the case of large dispersion of cost dispersion is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
From a policy perspective, I suggest that supplier should try to reduce the degree
of uncertainty with respect to the cost distribution where there exists both threshold
uncertainty and private information on public good valuations. In doing so, I predict
they would receive higher contributions and higher success rates.
I also get limited veriﬁcation that there is a tradoﬀ between contribution and
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success rate when the supplier considers whether they should increase the provision
cost in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance. The supplier can receive higher
contribution by increasing each possible provision cost. However, they might suﬀer
a lower probability of providing the public good.
In this paper, I have shown that the diﬀerent degrees of the threshold uncertainty
indeed aﬀect individual voluntary contribution decisions. Another factor, private
information on valuation, is worth investigating. Future researchers could conduct
another laboratory experiment to test whether individual contribution behavior is
aﬀected by participants being given diﬀerent information on valuation.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation investigates individual voluntary contribution behavior from
three diﬀerent, but related, perspectives. In the entire work, I place emphasis on the
subscription game with private information on valuation and threshold uncertainty,
both theoretically and experimentally. The ﬁnal goal is to provide a set of theo-
retical frameworks and experimental tools which can be used to understand private
contribution to the public goods. On the one hand, I theoretically show that the
contribution decisions are diﬀerent when individuals face diﬀerent levels of threshold
uncertainty; they are also diﬀerent when individuals are in diﬀerent types of con-
tribution institution. On the other hand, I investigate the subscription game from
an experimental point of view and provide an experimental evidence that individual
contribution are aﬀected when individuals are informed diﬀerent levels of threshold
uncertainty.
The ﬁrst essay builds a theoretical subscription game model and studies the
eﬀects of comparative statics with respect to threshold uncertainty. We ﬁnd that if
the costs becomes more dispersed in the sense of mean-preserving spread, individuals,
on average, are less willing to contribute to the public good when there exists both
private information on public good valuations and threshold uncertainty. But, if
the cost increases in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance, individuals, on
average, are more willing to contribute to the public good. This theoretical result
provides a policy implication that suppliers can increase the private contribution if
they can either reduce the degree of uncertainty or increase the mean with respect to
the cost distribution in a simultaneous subscription with threshold uncertainty and
private information on public good valuations.
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The second essay develops a theoretical model and examines individual sequential
contribution to the public good in a subscription game with threshold uncertainty
and private information on valuation. This essay shows that individual contribution
is increasing with respect to the contributor’s order. Earlier contributors contribute
less than subsequent contributors. This result implies that earlier contributors can
free ride oﬀ later contributor and enjoy ﬁrst-mover advantage. Comparing the in-
dividual expected contribution in a sequential contribution institution to a simul-
taneous contribution institution, I ﬁnd that the expected total contribution in the
sequential institution is lower than the expected total contribution in a simultaneous
one. I also ﬁnd that the ex ante probability of providing the public good in the
sequential institution is lower than that in the simultaneous institution.
In the last essay, I conduct an experiment to analyze individual voluntary con-
tribution in an environment with private information on valuation and threshold
uncertainty and test the comparative statics with respect to the threshold uncer-
tainty. This essay shows that no matter what threshold uncertainty the individuals
face, the average contribution is signiﬁcantly higher than the Bayesian Nash equi-
librium. This result demonstrates that individual contribution behavior may not be
followed the objective of maximizing his/her own expected payoﬀ. Individual may
consider other factors when contributing to the public good. As to the comparative
statics with respect to threshold uncertainty, I ﬁnd that decreasing the degree of
threshold uncertainty in the sense of mean-preserving contraction makes individuals,
on average, more willing to contribute to a public good and receives higher success
rate. I also ﬁnd that increasing the mean of the threshold distribution in the sense
of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance makes individuals, on average, more willing to
contribute to a public good. According to the experimental results, I would like to
suggest that suppliers should try to reduce the degree of uncertainty with respect to
104
the cost distribution when there exists both threshold uncertainty and private infor-
mation on public good valuations. In doing so, I predict they would receive higher
total contributions and higher success rates.
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